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Notes
WHAT DO I DO NOW? A LAWYER'S DUTY
POST-SARBANES-OXLEY
In our complex society the accountant's certificate and the
lawyer's opinion can be instruments for inflicting pecuniary
loss more potent than the chisel or the crowbar. Of course,
Congress did not mean that any mistake of law or
misstatement of fact should subject an attorney or an
accountant to criminal liability simply because more skillful
practitioners would not have made them. But Congress
equally could not have intended that men holding themselves
out as members of these ancient professions should be able to
escape criminal liability on a plea of ignorance when they have
shut their eyes to what was plainly to be seen or represented a
knowledge they knew they did not possess.1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Fourteen Trillion. That is the amount of money believed lost on the
market during the last economic downturn. 2 In a short time, investor
anxiousness turned into uneasiness. 3 Sparing no shareholder, Enron,
WorldCom, Tyco, and Arthur Anderson became household names and
products of "infectious greed." 4 Executives of corporations, accountants,

1
United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir. 1964) (holding that a defendant
lawyer or attorney who deliberately closed his eyes to fraud had a duty to see that the
company was in violation of the Securities Act of 1933).
2
William S. Lerach, PlunderingAmerica: How American Investors Got Taken for Trillions by
Corporate Insiders, 8 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 69, 91 (2002). Economists blame the dramatic
drop in the greatest bull-market in history, beginning in March of 2000, on corporate fraud
realizations. Id.
3
Id. at 100-01. The financial reporting and disclosure practices of many public
companies started being questioned at the height of the market boom. Id. During the
economic boom, Americans invested record levels of monies in pension funds and in
individual retirement savings funds. Id. at 95.
4
Id. at 95-96; Gary S. Becker, What the Scandals Reveal: A Strong Economy, BUS. WK., Dec.
30, 2002, at 30; Mark Maremont & Jonathan Weil, Tyco's Problems on Accounting May Not Be
Over, WALL ST. J., May 5, 2003, at C1. Federal Reserve Chairman, Alan Greenspan,
recounted to Congress the depth of the corporate fraud and "infectious greed" that seemed
to have overcome the economy while the "historical guardians of financial information
were overwhelmed." Alan Greenspan, Federal Reserve Board's Semi-annual Policy Report to
the Congress (July 16, 2002), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/hh/
2002/july/testimony.htm.
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investment bankers, and lawyers were all thrust into the glaring
spotlight.Investors wanted answers, so Congress responded by
enacting the Corporate Accountability Act. 6 With this Act, Congress
went one step further than it ever had and mandated "friendly
7
disclosures" as the "right thing" for securities lawyers.
This Note analyzes the new federally promulgated ethics rules,
required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that govern corporate
lawyers. To do so, this Note considers the American Bar Association
("ABA") Model Rules, current interpretations of who is governed by the
rules, the role of lawyers within an organization, and the interest of
protecting the investing public. The purpose of the federal rule is to
provide an attorney with clear guidelines that encourage reporting of

Too many corporate executives sought ways to 'harvest' some of those
stock market gains ... [tihe incentives they created overcame the good
judgment of too many corporate managers. It is not that humans have
become any more greedy than in generations past. It is that the
avenues to express greed had grown so enormously.
Id.
Kala Anandarajah, The Advent of New Corporate Guardians,Bus. TIMES SINGAPORE, Aug.
29, 2002, at A3; Becker, supra note 4, at 30.
6
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 101-1107, 116 Stat. 745 (2002)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. & 18 U.S.C.). Congress coined the
Act as the Corporate Accountability Act. This Note will use the terms Corporate
Accountability Act, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and SOA interchangeably.
7
Id. § 307.
[Tihe crisis we've been confronting offer[s] unique opportunities as
well as difficult responsibilities for corporate lawyers. Recent events
underscore what we already knew -confidence in our capital markets
cannot be maintained if the public believes that corporate leaders, their
advisors or their cohorts, are "gaming" the system and focusing
principally, if not exclusively, on their own personal gain. We must
reassure investors after the string of recent scandals that such abuses of
the system are not, and will not be allowed to become, the norm in
American business.
There are least three ways to achieve this goal. First, Congress
can legislate new legal standards into law, as it has done in SarbanesOxley. Second, government can impose new regulatory requirements,
something we've done with unprecedented vigor over the last year,
and something new legislation directs us to expand upon. And finally,
those who should be sensitive to their own ethical and moral, as well
as legal, responsibilities can voluntarily undertake to ensure that the
highest standards prevail for all professionals- managers, directors,
accountants and lawyers.
Harvey L. Pitt, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association's Business
Law Section (Aug. 12, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch579.htm
[hereinafter SEC Address from Pitt].
5
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corporate fraud and misrepresentation. A reconcilable standard between
the federally promulgated and state bar rules is needed when creating
duty for an attorney to report, detect, or prevent instances of corporate
fraud. Part II of this Note discusses the initial federal securities
legislation and relevant history of the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002.8 This Part also discusses the Rules of Professional Conduct
and attorney-client privilege. 9 Part III of this Note analyzes the scope of
the body of attorneys subject to the newly enacted federal disclosure
rule. 10 Also analyzed are the policy considerations of the proposed
"noisy withdrawal" requirement." Additionally, this Part analyzes the
conflicts between the Securities and Exchange and state-promulgated
confidentiality and attorney-client privilege rules. 12 Part IV then
proposes a more defined and narrow interpretation of the scope of the
federally promulgated rule and recommendations for state bar
13
associations to better protect investors from corporate fraud.
II.

REGULATING CORPORATE AMERICA

In light of recent corporate financial and ethical scandals, legislators
were forced to address the question of how best to protect the investing
public when regulating securities. In August of 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxely
Act ("SOA") was passed by the 107th Congress and signed into law by
President George W. Bush. 14 The SOA was an attempt by Congress to
protect investors from the fraudulent and hapless acts of management
and others that lead to financial fraud or misstatements.' 5 SOA swept

a

infra Part II.A-C.
infra Part II.D.
infra Part III.A.
infra Part III.B.
infra Part III.B.

12

See
See
See
See
See

13

See infra Part W.

9
10

11

14 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 101-1107, 116 Stat. 745 (2002)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. & 18 U.S.C.).
15 148 CONG. REC. S6524-25 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Wellstone).
This bill does hold bad actors accountable for their fraud and
The legislation goes much further, and it should
deception....
because the problem goes much deeper. We are faced with much more
than just the wrongdoing of individual executives. We are faced with
a crisis in confidence in America's capital markets and in American
business.... lalbove and beyond hundreds of billions of dollars [have
been] wiped out. That is what has happened already. You do not
have investor confidence. Without investor confidence, we will not
have the economic recovery that we need. Jobs aren't being created.
Frankly, this affects all of us.
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more broadly than previous securities acts in its regulations directed
16
towards corporate attorneys and ethical standards.
A. How the Political and Economic Climate of the 1930s Forced the Issue of
FederalRegulation
For more than twenty years before the federal government formed
the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1934, states used "blue sky"
laws to regulate securities that traded within their state borders. 17 After
the 1929 stock market crash, it became clear that federal remedies were
needed to regulate securities across the nation.18 The market continued
to slide after making few modest gains during the next three years. 19
Declining productivity, increased floating of margin loans, and short
selling were considered major factors of the economic depression. 20 The

Michael P. Maslanka & Burton D. Brillhart, Sarbanes-Oxley Act Has GCs Shaking in
Their Shoes, TEX. LAW., Aug. 5, 2002, at 6.
17
DAVID P. MCCAFFREY & DAVID W. HART, WALL STREET POLICES ITSELF 44 (1998).
Kansas passed the first "blue sky" law in 1911, and all states, except Nevada, soon passed
similar laws. Id. The term "blue sky" came from the once hotbed of securities trading,
Kansas. 1 LoUIS Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 27 (Little, Brown & Co., 3d
ed. 1989) [hereinafter SECURITIES REGULATION]. During a discussion regarding the first
state securities trading regulation, a senator of the Kansas State Legislature stood up and
proclaimed that there were crooks who "would sell building lots in the blue sky in fee
simple." Id. at 34; see also SECURITIES REGULATION, supra, at 3-148 (describing the extent of
state securities laws and emergence of federal securities regulation); LOUIS LOSS & JOEL
SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 9 (Aspen Law & Bus., 4th ed. 2001)
[hereinafter FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION] (describing the differences in state
and federal securities regulation).
18
See Michael H. Dessent, Joe Six-Pack: United States v. O'Hagan, and Private Securities
Litigation Refornt: A Line Must Be Drawn, 40 ARIz. L. REV. 1137, 1145 (1998). Prior to federal
legislation, disclosure of material insider information was not required. Id. See generally
JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH (3d ed. 1972) (detailing the enormous
growth of manufacturing industries and businesses and the subsequent rapid fall of the
market due to corporate greed).
19 JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 3-14 (1982); see also ROBERT
SOBEL, PANIC ON WALL STREET (1968) (describing the rise and fall of the economy and big
business during the Great Depression). See generally Elisabeth Keller & Gregory A.
Gehlmann, A Historical Introduction to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 334-40 (1988) (describing the unethical behavior of securities
dealers which eventually helped to worsen the economy and prompt federal legislation
governing the securities market).
20
SELIGMAN, supra note 19, at 4-14. Before the crash in October of 1929, President
Hoover, in his inaugural address, encouraged the Federal Reserve Board to lower credit
lines for margin loans. Id. at 4. The Federal Reserve Board continued to meet without
issuing any policy statements; this silence softened "speculative fever" which in turn led to
massive trading on March 26th. Id. In complete defiance, the National City Bank
announced it would be borrowing money from the Federal Reserve Bank in order to
16
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business environment was dominated by mismanaged big businesses
and monopolies, which contributed to a large division between wealth
and poverty. 21 Additionally, with few checks on Wall Street's "selfregulation," there was little that could be done without major economic
reform and federal legislation to help the market operate effectively.2
With political pressure climbing, and after months of delay tactics,
the Senate Banking Committee began investigating securities practices
taking place in the market. 23 President Hoover initially wanted the
managers of the Exchange to "self regulate" to avoid federal regulation. 24
However, after much resistance from the managers, he was forced to

prevent liquidation of its margin loans. Id. President Hoover backed down, and the
market began to rise throughout the summer of 1929 by nearly 25%. Id. After the crash in
to urge regulatory reform; he instead held conferences with
October, Hoover did little
industrial leaders and spoke of "volunteerism" in maintaining what he called the
"fundamental business of the country, that is, production and distribution" of employment
and wages. Id. at 4-5. President Hoover was reluctant to regulate banking laws, primarily
because he believed there was a lack of constitutional authority to nationalize the laws. Id.
Soon after the market crash, several bills were introduced into Congress to regulate
corporate financial statements, margin loans, and short selling. Id. at 5. The market made a
very modest recovery in the months after the crash; however, the economic depression
continued. Id. at 5-6. President Hoover blamed the drop in the market on declining
productivity while leading critics in the Senate continued to push financial issues into the
public eye. Id. By 1931, the effect of short selling became a focus of financial regulation. Id.
at 9. Margin loans are the amounts advanced to the buyer or speculator in the stock market
by the broker which become due if any losses occur on the purchases. OXFORD DICTIONARY
FOR THE BUSINESS WORLD 596 (1993). Short selling is the sale of stocks that one does not
have; short sellers expect prices to fall so that they can purchase stock at a lower price and
then sell to buyer at a previously contracted higher price. Id. at 774.
21

ROBERT CHATOV, CORPORATE FINANCIAL REPORTING 13-18 (1975); see ROBERT SOBEL,

THE AGE OF GIANT CORPORATIONS: A MICROECONOMic HISTORY OF AMERICAN BUSINESSES

1914-1984, 52-152 (2d ed. 1984) (discussing the growth of national markets, development
and diversification of commerce trade, and the effect it had on the banking and commodity
trading markets).
22 CHATOV, supra note 21, at 24-25; Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 19, at 337-38.
23 SELIGMAN, supra note 19, at 4-38. The full Senate proposed an investigation into stock
exchange practices in response to the bear-raiding taking place on the market. Id. at 13.
After months of postponing the investigation, President Hoover scheduled an emergency
meeting of the Senate Banking Committee due to rumors of new market troubles. Id. The
very next day, the Senate Banking Committee subpoenaed the New York Exchange
president to testify before the committee. Id. This was the beginning of what are known as
the Pecora Hearings, which were ultimately responsible for the Securities & Banking Acts
of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the creation of the Securities and
Exchange Commission. Id. See generally GALBRAITH, supra note 18 (explaining the effect of
the Senate hearings on business practices).
24

SELIGMAN, supra note 19, at 4-9.

See generally HERBERT HOOVER, MEMOIRS:

THE

CABINET AND THE PRESIDENCY (1952) (detailing the memoirs of President Hoover during
the time of turmoil of the Great Depression).
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25
initiate investigations on the practices of the New York Stock Exchange.
The Pecora Hearings, named after the Committee's Counsel, Ferdinand
Pecora, lasted over nine months with many widely publicized
investigations. 26 The Pecora Hearings brought to light numerous cases
of elaborate schemes to manipulate the market.27 Some of the frauds
discovered during the investigation included false reporting of favorable
news stories to boost stock prices in exchange for pay-offs, manipulation
of purchases, and sell-offs of stocks by high-ranking executives within
large companies. 28

These investigations received much national attention, and
Democratic Presidential candidate, Franklin Roosevelt, built a platform
advocating federal securities legislation. 29 After Roosevelt was elected to
office, the waning Senate hearings received a jolt.30 Peter Norbeck, the
self-proclaimed "Franklin Roosevelt Republican" from South Dakota and
an influential member of the Senate Banking Committee, hired Pecora as
the Committee's Counsel.31 Upon Pecora's hiring, the Committee
conducted many new investigations to uncover the fraud and
manipulation of the banking and securities marketplace. 32 Pecora's
relentless investigations and persistent questions led to a public response
33
that in turn led to the passage of the Securities Act of 1933.

25
26

SELIGMAN, supra note 19, at 10.

27

Id. at 9, 14-18; Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 19, at 339.

28

SELIGMAN, supra note 19, at 16-19; see also T.K. QUINN, GIANT BUSINESS: THREAT TO

Id. at 12-13.

DEMOCRACY (1954) (revealing an insider's experience and perspective on the growth and
management manipulation of the markets by the big businesses); Keller & Gehlmann, supra
note 19, at 349-52 (discussing the market manipulations that eventually forced federal
securities regulations).
29
SELIGMAN, supra note 19, at 16-18. During his campaign, Roosevelt often blamed
President Hoover for much of the economic problems that plagued the nation. Id. He also
proposed federal regulation of securities exchanges, a separation of commercial and
investment banking, and banning the use of federal funds from being used for speculative
purposes. Id.
0
Id. at 18-20.
31 Id. at 21. Pecora was the chief assistant to the New York District Attorney, and during
his ten-year tenure, he was credited with the successful prosecution of over 150 fraudulent
securities salesmen. Id.
32
33

Id. at 21-24; see also SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 17, at 168-71.

SELIGMAN, supra note 19, at 38. Pecora initiated an investigation into the practices of
Morgan and Company. Id. at 34. The investigation revealed that the company kept
preferred customer lists that the company used to offer stock at cost, or slightly above cost,
before the security began to trade on the exchange for an expected substantially higher
price. Id. Throughout the investigation it was shown that millions of shares were
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The Influence of the Initial Legislation - The Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934

The Securities Act of 1933 ("Act") is often referred to as the bill that
sought to protect investors by requiring full and fair disclosure of
financial information to potential investors. 34 The objective of fair
disclosure was accomplished by requiring any company offering
securities for public sale, except for minor exceptions, to disclose to
investors pertinent company information. 35 The Act did not require
screening of the potential viability of a company, but focused on making
the information available to investors so that they would have the
necessary information to make informed choices.36 The Act required that
corporations disclose relevant corporate information to the public
through registration, including a prospectus. 37 It also created a right for
the investor to recover losses incurred as a result of false or misleading
reports filed or reported by the company. 38 Finally, it required an
independent auditor to certify that the disclosed financial information
39
was reasonably accurate.

exchanged using this method and that many prominent political figures had managed to
benefit from being on the list, including Richard Whitney during his presidency of the New
York Stock Exchange. Id.
34 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (2000); SELIGMAN, supra note 19, at 3940, 71. The Act required companies to give full disclosure of information regarding the
business, capital needs, officers, and securities issuance costs. SELIGMAN, supra note 19, at
70. In addition to other registration requirements, business executives, underwriters, and
financial or accounting officers could be held liable if it was proven that they had acted
without due diligence and there was an untrue statement or omitted fact in the registration
statement. Id.; see, e.g., Dessent, supra note 18, at 1145-46; Steve Thel, The OriginalConception
of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 414-24 (1990).
35

DAVID L. RATNER, SECURITIES REGULATION IN A NUTSHELL 32 (6th ed. 1998); K. FRED
SKOUSEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SEC 20 (1987).
36
SKOUSEN, supra note 35, at 20. The SEC uses the reporting requirements to determine
if the registration statement and prospectus are deficient, not to judge the merits of an
offering. Id.; see also ROBERT E. SHIELDS & ROBERT H. STROUSE, SECURITIES PRACTICE

HANDBOOK 17-22 (5th ed. 1987) (describing the process in which the SEC evaluates the
registration and other compliance materials in order to assure that the information made
available to the investors is complete).
37

SHIELDS & STROUSE, supranote 36, at 17-18.

38 Securities Act of 1933 § 11; SKOUSEN, supra note 35, at 20. Additionally, hefty fines and
penalties can be imposed on companies that file false or misleading registration materials.
Securities Act of 1933 § 11.

39 Securities Act of 1933 § 11; SKOUSEN, supra note 35, at 20-22. The Act allows for
accountants to be held liable for the accuracy of the disclosed information. Securities Act of
1933 § 11.
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After the passage of the Securities Act of 1933, the next issue on
President Roosevelt's agenda was the regulation of the Securities
Exchange. 40 The heated debate over the extent of regulation of the
markets often centered on the issue of when and how much
governmental interference in economic affairs was justified. 41 Senator
Duncan Fletcher introduced a final version of a bill, supported by
President Roosevelt, into the Senate the same day that Sam Rayburn,
Chairman of the House Banking Committee, introduced it into the
House of Representatives. 42 This bill, which came to be known as the
Fletcher-Rayburn bill, developed into the Securities Exchange Act of
43
1934 ("Exchange Act").
Although the bill, in its original form, sought to regulate the
exchanges by granting authority to the Federal Trade Commission, the
amendments to this bill granted authority to an entirely new body, the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). 44 Another substantial
change to the original bill was an amendment that called for the SEC to
specify margin requirements in the legislation, instead of a formula that
would allow for adjustments in the market. 45 Additionally, the House
dropped the provision prohibiting any sale within six months of
46
insiders' purchases of their own corporation's securities for a profit.

SELIGMAN, supra note 19, at 79-85; see also SOBEL, supra note 19, at 94-121 (recounting
the perspective of business insiders to growing federal regulation).
41
SELIGMAN, supra note 19, at 89-92. The New York Stock Exchange President, Richard
Whitney, an opponent to the bill, testified that the proposed bill gives the Federal Trade
Commission so much power that the commission might not just regulate but might
"actually ... supervise and manage all stock exchanges and establish indirectly a form of
nationalization of business and industry which has hereto been alien to the American
theory of Federal Government." Id. at 90; Thel, supra note 34, at 420.
42
Thel, supra note 34, at 425-26. The initial bill encountered intense debate and heavy
opposition from multiple parties, leading to numerous amendments that eventually made
the enacted version of the bill substantially different from the proposed version. Id. at 42456.
43
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78111 (2000); Thel, supra note 34, at
425-26.
44
Thel, supra note 34, at 426-34. Ironically, the SEC was the brainchild of one the bill's
biggest opponents, Richard Whitney, the New York Stock Exchange President. SELIGMAN,
supra note 19, at 97.
45
Id. at 97-98. The elimination of the formula requirement was a result of heavy
lobbying from investors and brokers. Id. Without a formula that adjusted for gains and
losses in the market, dealers and brokers could engage in increased margin selling as the
market grew. Id.
46
Thel, supra note 34, at 428.
40
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With these amendments, the bill passed, but not without great
47
controversy.
In the Exchange Act, Congress delegated to the SEC the power to
determine the form, content, and rules for all required financial reports
that furthered the congressional objectives of preventing stock
manipulation and providing investors with reliable financial disclosures
and pertinent business information.4 8 The SEC was granted authority to
urge businesses to ensure that investors receive fair and accurate
reporting.49 The authority granted by Congress included the SEC's
ability to initiate litigation in cases of fraud and to mandate provisions
50
for securities registrations.
Congress also granted the SEC the ability to regulate the accounting
practices of companies and other business aspects that fall within the
reporting and disclosure requirements mandated by the federal
securities laws. 51 Although Congress explicitly delegated the accounting
authority to the SEC, the SEC chose to turn over its powers by reasoning
"that it considers those accounting principles, standards, and practices

Id. at 426. Representative Rayburn, during a floor debate, accused opponents of
coercing and forging letters of opposition. SELIGMAN, supra note 19, at 98. Senator Fletcher
successfully stymied several proposed amendments within the Senate. Id. In a quote from
the New York Times, he stated, "Not in years, has a bill of such controversial nature been
passed by so overwhelming a majority." Id.; see also SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 17,
at 32-37.
48
CHATOV, supra note 21, at 1-2.
49
SKOUSEN, supra note 35, at 7.
50
Id. at 12-14. Many scholars believe that the SEC was not necessarily created to prevent
frauds like those taking place when the Securities Acts were enacted but that the SEC's
primary role was "to provide information that can be used to make better decisions, which
in turn leads to more efficient capital markets." Id. at 7. The securities laws were passed
with the purpose of promoting financial disclosure and imposing severe penalties for
presenting false and misleading information. Id. at 39. Additionally, the role of the SEC is
to determine if the reporting companies have complied with the statute and regulations;
any deficiencies or fraudulent acts in the reporting are the responsibility of the company
and its management and agents. Id. The ultimate judgment lies with the investor. Id. See
generally HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIEs LAW (1966) (discussing the evolution of the
SEC, the regulations, and the extent of the SEC's investigative provisions and duties).
51 SKOUSEN, supra note 35, at 108. Congress felt that in order for the SEC to fulfill its
objective of full and fair disclosure, it would need some control of the accounting principles
and practices by the companies in their reporting. Id. at 106. Harry A. McDonald, a former
commissioner of the SEC stated, "One fact will always be dominant in shaping the course
of accounting-the fact that whether directly or through his advisers, whether alone or
through the medium of an agency like the SEC, the investor cannot help but look to the
accountant." Id. at 108. See generally CHATOV, supra note 21 (discussing the development of
the accounting practices and the influence and effect of the SEC's congressional authority).
47
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promulgated by the [Financial Accounting Standards Board] as having
substantial authoritative support."5 2 However, the SEC chose to use the
power granted under the Exchange Act to promulgate its Rules of
Practice.53 The Rules of Practice cover a wide variety of areas, including
the manner and form in which information should be reported.54
Prior to the enactment of the SOA, the SEC invoked Rule 102(e) of its
Rules of Practice, to discipline professionals. 55 Rule 102(e) allows the
SEC to discipline a professional by suspending, limiting, or barring the
professional from practicing before it in any way. 56 In the past, the SEC
has used this power to discipline both accountants and attorneys. 57 The
rule has been justified as a means of maintaining the integrity of the
58
practice, but not necessarily as a remedy for securities violations. Most
courts consider the rule a valid exercise of authority under the general
rulemaking powers granted by Congress to the SEC. 59

SKOUSEN, supra note 35, at 108.
53 SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 17, at 2913-23; see also In the Matter of Carter &
Johnson, Exchange Act Release No. 34,17597, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 82,847 (Feb. 28, 1981) (stating that the SEC had the authority to promulgate rules
that further the purpose and objectives of the SEC) [hereinafter In re Carter & Johnson]. See
generally SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201 (2002).
52

54

SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 17, at 2913-23.

55

17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (1998).
(e) Suspension and disbarment.
(1) Generally. The Commission may censure a person or deny,
temporarily or permanently, the privilege of appearing or practicing
before it in any way to any person who is found by the Commission
after notice and opportunity for hearing in the matter:
(i) Not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent others; or
(ii) To be lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged in
unethical or improper professional conduct; or
(iii) To have willfully violated, or willfully aided and abetted the
violation of any provision of the Federal securities laws or the rules
and regulations thereunder.
Id.; see 3 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, LAW SEC. REG. § 16.2(18) (4th ed. 2002); infra note 57 and
accompanying text.
%'
17 C.F.R. §201.102(e); 3 HAZEN, supra note 55, § 16.2(18).
57 3 HAZEN, supra note 55, § 16.2(18). Currently, most circuits hold that the SEC is acting
within its authority even in the absence of express statutory authority. Id.; see Potts v. SEC,
151 F.3d 810 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that accountants may be suspended for violating Rule
102(e)); Sheldon v. SEC, 45 F.3d 1515 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that use of Rule 102(e)
against attorneys was constitutional); Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979)
(holding that the SEC is within its statutory authority in disciplining professionals in order
to maintain integrity of its overall purpose and procedures).
58 In re Carter & Johnson, supra note 53.
59 3 HAZEN, supranote 55, § 16.2(18); see supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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In 1981, the SEC ruled that scienter must be shown in order to
discipline attorneys under Rule 102(e).60 The SEC, in an administrative
proceeding, found that Rule 102(e) addressed the problem of
professional misconduct and was limited as such only to protect the
investing public. 61 In cases where there is conduct by attorneys that falls
short of scienter, the SEC has delegated to its General Counsel the
authority to refer the alleged professional misconduct to relevant state
bar authorities. 62 The SEC has continued to struggle with balancing the

60

In re Carter & Johnson, supra note 53 (holding that the Commission failed to prove

scienter on the part of the attorneys); Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(remanding to the SEC because of failure to distinguish adequately the scienter standards
for attorney and accountant liability).
61
In re Carter & Johnson, supra note 53, at 296.
[This rule] is not intended to provide an administrative remedy as an
alternative to our power to seek injunctive relief for violations of
provisions of the securities laws which do not already provide for an
administrative remedy. For example, it does not reach any of the
myriad of non-professionals who may have been involved in
violations of the securities laws for which an administrative remedy is
not available. It is addressed to a different problem- professional
misconduct-and its sanction is limited to that necessary to protect the
investing public and the Commission from the future impact on its
[The rule] represents a
processes of professional misconduct.
balancing of public benefits. It rests upon the recognition that the
privilege of practicing before the Commission is a mechanism that
generates great leverage-for good or evil-in the administration of
the securities laws. A significant failure to perform properly the
professional's role has implications extending beyond the particular
transaction involved, for wrongdoing by a lawyer or an accountant
raises the spectre of a replication of the conduct with other clients.
Recognition of the public implications of the securities
professional's role does not mean that the Commission has, by rule,
imposed duties to the public on lawyers where such duties would not
otherwise exist.... [Tihe traditional role of the lawyer as a counselor
is to advise his client, not the public, about the law. [The Rule] does
not change nature of that obligation. Nevertheless, if a lawyer violates
ethical or professional standards, or becomes a conscious participant in
violations of the securities laws, or performs his professional function
without regard to the consequences, it will not do to say that because
the lawyer's duty is to the client alone, this Commission must stand
helplessly by while the lawyer carries his privilege of appearing and
practicing before the Commission on to the next client.
Id.
62

3 HAZEN, supra note 55, § 16.2(18).
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interest of protecting the public against over-regulation of the trading
63
markets.
C. How the Political and Economic Climate Forced Congress to Revisit Federal
Securities Legislation: The Passageof the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
Despite the drastically evolving market, congressional mandates,
and judicial interpretation of the Securities Acts, the SEC has been
steadfast in its primary goal of full disclosure. 64 However, the evolving
market forced Congress to revisit the laws to determine what additional
steps were needed to protect the public.
From 1997 to 2000, American companies seemed to be producing at
full capacity, growing ten-fold, and increasing profits by unimaginable
numbers. 65 Little seemed to dampen the market as the tech boom ran its
course. 66 In mid-2000, the market began to slide. 67 Companies restated
their earnings in record numbers.68 Investor confidence waned as

63 Thel, supra note 34, at 462. Observers have commented that the SEC has a split
personality: the "sunlight" SEC which closely administers the disclosures and anti-fraud
elements of the securities acts, verses the "regulatory" SEC which regulates the trading
markets. Id. The SEC often de-emphasizes its role in the regulation of the trading markets.
Id.
64 JOEL SELIGMAN, THE SEC AND THE FUTURE OF FINANCE 195-197 (1985).
65
Kevin Phillips, The New Face of Another Gilded Age, WASH. POST, May 26, 2002, at B02.
During the boom, the Dow Jones market set the top ten greatest net one-day point gains,
including the record of 499.19 points, a 4.93% change. Dow Jones Average Statistics (Mar. 32,
2004) available at http://www.indexes.dowjones.com/jsp/avgStatistics.jsp.
The market
had noticed its greatest percentage change gains during the years of 1929-1932. Id.
Additionally, the market set eight of the ten days with greatest point net loss records,
ranging from 684.81 to 374.47 between 1998 and 2002. Id. Seven of the ten record holders
for the greatest percentage losses were prior to 1933, ranging from 22.61% to 7.75%. Id.
Five of the ten best years occurred before 1933, with none occurring after 1975. Id. Seven of
the ten worst years occurred prior to 1933, with none occurring after 1974. Id. The Dow
topped 11,722 in January of 2000, mid-7000s in mid-2002, and was trading in the mid-9000s
as
of
September
of
2003.
Dow
Data
2000-2009,
available
at
http://www.indexes.dowjones.com/jsp/avgDecades.jsp?decade=2000 (last visited Apr.
26, 2004); Dow Jones Indexes, available at http://www.averages.dowjones.com/jsp/index.jsp
(last visited Apr. 26, 2004).
66 Charles Stein, In the End, Limited Damage: Initial Blow Keenly Felt but Economy Returned
to Growth Late Last Year, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 11, 2002, at Cl; Phillips, supra note 65, at B02.
67 Neal St. Anthony & Mike Blahnik, Money Managers: Rolling the Dice, STAR TRIB., Jan. 5,
2003, at 1D; James P. Miller, Crackdown Sparks Rebound, CHI. TRIB., July 25, 2002, at C13; see
also supra note 65 (providing stock market data).
8
ARTHUR LEVITT, TAKE ON WALL STREET 117 (2002). Levitt describes the downhill slide
as all encompassing. Id.
It wasn't just a case of a few bad apples... [b]lue-chip companies with
sterling reputations were manipulating their numbers in misleading
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corporate misstatement disclosures, combined with the terrorist attacks
69
of September 11, 2001, helped to send the market further downward.
Throughout 2001 and 2002, corporate giants like Enron, WorldCom,
Qwest, and Tyco collapsed, forcing Congress to address the growing
70
concerns of companies' financial disclosures and investor losses.
Enron, an energy giant based in Houston, Texas, was forced to disclose
its numerous accounting "discrepancies" upon failure to show a profit
on numerous off-balance sheet transactions and ultimate default of loan
1
Tyco, a
payments resulting from faulty hedge transactions'
manufacturing conglomerate based in Seattle, Washington, was

ways. From 1997 through 2000, 700 companies would find flaws in
past financial statements and restate their earnings. By comparison,
only three companies restated in 1981. These came at a tremendous
cost to investors, who would lose hundreds of billions of dollars in
market value.
Id.
69

Anatole Kaletsky, A Story of the Fed in Wonderland as Greenspan Puts Emphasis in
Growth, TIMES (London), June 24, 2003, at 23; Grace Shim, Investors Questioning Even BlueChip Firms, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Feb. 17, 2002, at 1D; Stein, supra note 66, at C1.
70
Stanley S. Arkin, Business Crime, Corporate Responsibility Legislation:
Conflicts,
Uncertainties, 228 N.Y. L.J. 3 (2002); Lerach, supra note 2, at 73. The Nasdaq fell to 1,139
points from a high of 5,085. Lerach, supra note 2, at 71.
It's getting to the point where reported earnings in many cases are
whatever management wants them to be. If you overstate, no sweat.
Just take a writedown later.... It takes two to create a deceptiondeceiver and deceived. Plenty of the latter are around these days.
Fifteen years of nearly unbroken bull markets have made people
willing, eager to believe in financial miracles .... "Accounting tricks
are always going on" ... "[wihat's changed is that companies are
getting away with more now".... It's been a great bull market, but
one that's full of dangers and getting more dangerous all the time.
Bernard Condon, Pick a Number, Any Number, FORBES MAG., Mar. 23, 1998, at 74. Many
predicted the fall of giant corporations due to corporate greed and accounting games. Id.
71
Jonathon Weil, Basic Principleof Accounting Tripped Enron, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2001, at
C1. Enron disclosed that over a 1.2 billion-dollar reduction in shareholder equity was due
to improper recording of issued common stock to four "special-purpose" entities. Id. In
exchange for the Enron stock, Enron received a note receivable from these "special
purpose" entities instead of cash. Id. Against basic accounting rules, Enron improperly
recorded its transactions as cash, which in turn increased shareholder equity on the
financial statements. Id. Additionally, when the receivables due to Enron and other
debtors came due, the "special purpose" entities were unable to pay. Id. The entities
subsequently defaulted on their loans for which Enron became ultimately responsible as
primary or sole shareholders of the entities. THE ROLE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS IN
ENRON'S COLLAPSE, S. REP. No. 107-78, at 46-50 (2002); see also Jeffrey N. Gordon, What
Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial
Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1233-35 (2002) (detailing the rise and fall of the energy
giant and the effect on corporate governance models).
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ultimately forced to disclose the numerous loans made to its Chief
Executive Officer ("CEO") and the Chief Financial Officer ("CFO")
among its other fraudulent accounting schemes. 72 WorldCom, a leading
telecommunications corporation based in Mississippi, filed for Chapter
11 Bankruptcy when it was forced to disclose and restate its financial
statements after reporting that it had inflated profits by more than seven
billion dollars. 73 WorldCom improperly capitalized expenses, instead of
expensing them on the income statement as they were incurred, in order
to help meet expected earnings numbers. 74
Similarly, Qwest
Communications, a leading telecommunications corporation based in
Denver, Colorado, restated close to a billion dollars in inflated profits
due to the revelation of a sham-swapping agreement. 75
Each of these misstatements were caused by manipulative acts of
management, improper accounting, and sloppy auditing, which
ultimately led to the devaluation of shareholder investments and

Mark Maremont & Laurie P. Cohen, Tyco Probe Expands to Include Auditor
PricewoaterhouseCoopers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 2002, at Al. Prosecutors allege that the former
Tyco CEO, L. Dennis Kozlowski, and ex-chief financial officer, Mark H. Schwartz, stole
$170 million in unauthorized compensation and also participated in an illegal scheme in
which they gained another $430 million dollars from stock sales. Id. It is alleged that these
payments were improperly withheld from proxy statements and shareholders.
Id.
Investigations are still being conducted into Tyco's alleged fraudulent accounting which
involved illegal gains in the optical-fiber unit's initial public offering, forgiven loans to
employees, including the former CEO and CFO, and reported material misstatements in
financial and tax reporting. Id. In June of 2003, A New York State Supreme Court judge
refused to dismiss criminal indictments against the former executives. Tyco Int'l Ltd: Judge
Declines to Dismiss Charges Against Ex-Executives, WALL ST. J., June 24, 2003, at B6.
73
Deborah Solomon, WorldCom's Ex-Controller Pleads Guilty to Fraud, WALL ST. J., Sept.
27, 2002, at A3. David F. Meyers, former CFO of WorldCom, plead guilty to fraud
admitting that he was part of a scheme that "helped manufacture profits at the behest of
,senior management' as part of a massive scheme to defraud investors and meet Wall Street
expectations." Id. In court, Meyers stated that he was repeatedly "instructed on a
quarterly basis by senior management to ensure that entries were made to falsify
WorldCom's books, to reduce WorldCom's reported actual costs, and therefore increase
WorldCom's reported earnings." Id.
72

74
75

Id.

Shawn Young, Qwest to Restate $950 Million of Revenue Tied to "Swap" Deals, WALL ST.
J.,
Sept. 23, 2002, at A12. The alleged swap deal involved the sale and booked revenue of a
network to another carrier while simultaneously purchasing an identical network from
another carrier for almost the same amount. Id. These deals were used often by carriers
such as Qwest and Global Crossing and served little purpose other than to inflate revenues.
Id. The SEC recently ruled that such recorded deals were improperly booked and have
opened an investigation into Qwest's accounting. Id.
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employee retirement plans. 76 The seemingly continuous stream of fraud
and accounting misstatements taking place at the highest levels of
corporations, in combination with the sinking stock market, infuriated
and disappointed investors. 77 There was a sharp decline in investor

Lerach, supra note 2, at 105. See generally C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate
Social Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century, 51 U. KAN. L.
REV. 77 (2002) (describing the similarity in cycles of businesses, markets, and corporate
greed over the past 120 years).
77 John R. Wilke, PresidentPraises Work of Task Force on Business Crime, WALL ST. J., Sept.
27, 2002, at A4. On July 9, 2002, President Bush signed an executive order forming a
Taskforce on Business Crime to help ease interagency conflicts and coordination in multijurisdictional
cases.
President's
Ten-Point
Plan,
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/corporateresponsibility/index2.html
(last visited
Apr. 26, 2004). The President is also focused on improving the quality of corporate
disclosure and the accountability of executives and auditors. Id. The Corporate Fraud
Conference, sponsored by the President's Corporate Fraud Task Force, released a plan to
tackle corporate fraud and investor uneasiness and has brought numerous cases against
defendants for civil and criminal wrongdoing. Id. The ten-point plan includes:
1.
Each investor should have quarterly access to the information
needed to judge a firm's financial performance, condition, and risks.
2.
Each investor should have prompt access to critical information.
3.
CEOs should personally vouch for the veracity, timeliness, and
fairness of their companies' public disclosures, including their
financial statements.
4.
CEOs or other officers should not be allowed to profit from
erroneous financial statements.
5.
CEOs or other officers who clearly abuse their power should lose
their right to serve in any corporate leadership positions.
6.
Corporate leaders should be required to tell the public promptly
when they buy or sell company stock for personal gain.
7.
Investors should have complete confidence in the independence
and the integrity of the companies' auditors.
8.
An independent regulatory board should ensure that the
accounting profession is held to the highest ethical standards.
9.
The authors of accounting standards must be responsive to the
needs of investors.
10. Firms' accounting systems should be compared with best
practices, not simply against minimum standards.
Id. President Bush continued his effort by emphasizing the importance of stressing ethics
in corporate boardrooms at a speaking event. President Bush, Remarks at the Malcolm
Baldrige
National
Quality
Award
Ceremony
(Mar.
7,
2002),
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020307-3.html. Additionally, the
SEC has added fifty staff members, and the FBI has assigned over 2,000 agents to
investigate white-collar crime. Wilke, supra. The FBI's white-collar force nearly equals the
amount of agents assigned to battle terrorism. Id. See generally Kerry L. Francis & Albert
Lilienfeld, Financial Accounting and Reporting Fraud What Does It Look Like, in CORP. LAW
2002, at 627 (PLI Corp. Law Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 1332, 2002) (describing
the various and most frequently used accounting schemes concocted by corporations to
inflate profits); John C. Coffee, UnderstandingEnron: "It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid," 57
76
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willingness to trust corporations and the stock markets that seemed to
parallel the climate prior to the passage of the 1933 Securities Act. 78
Within this climate, Congress responded to the public outcry by
passing the SOA just two short weeks after its introduction in the
Senate.79 The SOA addresses many areas of investor concern, including
80
an extension of the statute of the limitations for securities fraud actions,
for
insider
trading, 81
protection
additional
regulation
of
82
whistleblowers, creation of a Public Company Accounting Oversight

Bus. LAW. 1403 (2002) (analyzing the issue of the roles audit firms and law firms play in
corporate governance).
78 Lerach, supra note 2, at 105.
79 Arkin, supra note 70, at 3. The SOA has been described as "legislation as redolent of
populist anger as it is of well-intentioned and needed reforms." Id. "The law tries to
restore confidence in business through regulation of executives and their advisorsincluding lawyers." Dwyer, supra note 68, at 74. The SOA included all recommendations
made in the "Ten-Point Plan" proposed by the president and gave new and improved tools
for prosecutors and regulators to improve corporate responsibility and improve the
protection of shareholders and employees. Wilke, supra note 77, at A4.
80 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 804, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). This
section amends § 1658 of Title 28 to allow for:
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) a private right of action that
involves a claim of fraud, deceit, manipulation, or contrivance in
contravention of a regulatory requirement concerning the securities
laws, as defined ... [in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934], may be
brought not later than the earlier of(1) 2 years after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation; or
(2) 5 years after such violation.
Id. This is in comparison to the prior one- and three-year periods that existed under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
81 Id. § 306. This section creates a new derivative action against officers and directors
who trade their company's stock during the blackout period when participants in the
company's pension plans can not trade. Id. This section is specifically in response to the
alleged sales of Enron executives millions of dollars of stocks just prior to and during the
period that all sales of stock owned by non-executive company employees were prohibited
from selling. The black-out period under the act is defined as:
any period of more than three consecutive business days during which
the ability of not fewer than 50 percent of the participants or
beneficiaries ... to purchase, sell, or otherwise acquire or transfer an
interest in any equity ... held in such an individual account plan is
temporarily suspended by the issuer or by a fiduciary of the plan.
Id. In addition, § 306 creates a remedy through an action of recovery of any profits made in
violation of § 306. Id.
82 Id. § 806. This section creates a remedy for whistleblowers that suffer retaliation. Id.
This section is broad in that it also covers acts of an employee that "provide information,
cause information to be provided, or otherwise assist in an investigation regarding any
conduct which the employee reasonably believes constitutes a violation of ... any rule or
regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission." Id.
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Board, 83 creation of fund accounts to compensate victims of securities
laws violations,84 regulation of CEO and CFO certification, 85 elimination

Id. § 101. This section establishes an accounting oversight board:
[tlo oversee the audit of public companies that are subject to the
securities laws ... in order to protect the interests of investors and
further the public interest in the preparation of informative, accurate,
and independent audit reports for companies the securities of which
are sold to, and held by and for, public investors.
Id. The Board is not considered a government agency but will be funded by fees on all the
publicly traded companies. Id. § 109. Additionally, all of the Board's actions are subject to
action and review by the SEC. Id. § 101(g).
84 Id. § 308. This section provides that the SEC, upon a judicial or administrative action,
can obtain an order "requiring disgorgement against any person for a violation" for "the
benefit of the victims." Id.
85 Id. § 302. This section requires:
(a) [tihat the principal executive officer... and the principal financial
officer... certify in each annual or quarterly report... that...
(1) the signing officer has reviewed the report;
(2) based on the officer's knowledge, the report does not contain any
untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading;
(3) based on such officer's knowledge, the financial statements, and
other financial information included in the report, fairly present in all
material respects the financial condition and results of operations of
the issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in the report.
Id. Additionally, this section requires that the signing officers be responsible for creating
and maintaining internal controls, ensuring that the internal controls are designed to
disclose material information to the officers, evaluating the effectiveness of the internal
controls within 90 days prior to the report, presenting the conclusions about the
effectiveness of the internal controls based on their last review, disclosing to the audit
committee and company's auditors any material deficiencies or detected fraud, and
reporting any significant changes in internal control that could affect internal controls
subsequent to the date of their evaluation. Id.
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and creation of a new crime of

Section 307 of the SOA was initiated and lobbied for by a group of
law professors in a letter dated March 7, 2002 to the then SEC Chairman
Harvey Pitt.88 The letter recommended that Enron-like matters and
frauds required that special attention be given to the role that lawyers
play in public companies. 89 Additionally the professors argued that the

8

Id. § 402.
(1) [In General] - It shall be unlawful for any issuer ...directly or
indirectly, including through any subsidiary, to extend or maintain
credit, to arrange for the extension of credit, or to renew an extension
of credit, in the form of a personal loan to or for any director or
executive officer (or equivalent thereof) of that issuer. An extension of
credit maintained by the issuer on the date of enactment of this
subsection shall not be subject to the provisions of this subsection,
provided that there is no material modification to any term of any such
extension of credit or any renewal of any such extension of credit on or
after that date of enactment.
(2) Limitation- Paragraph (1) does not preclude any home
improvement and manufactured home loans ... [and] consumer
credit, or any extension of credit under an open end credit plan ... or a
charge card.

Id.
87

Id. § 807.
Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or
artifice (1) to defraud any person in connection with any security of an issuer
with a class of securities registered under section 12 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 ...or that is required to file reports under
section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934...; or
(2) to obtain, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises, any money or property in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security of an issuer with a class of
securities registered ... or that is required to file reports ... shall be

fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than 25 years, or both.
Id.
Audrey Strauss, Up-the-Ladder Reporting Under Sarbanes-Oxley, 228 N.Y. L.J. 5 (2002).
The lawyers consisted of various professors who specialized in securities regulation
and/or professional responsibility. Letter from Richard Painter & other law professors, to
Harvey Pitt, SEC Chairman (Mar. 7, 2002) (on file with the Valparaiso University Law
Review).
89
Id.
As professors of securities regulation and/or professional
responsibility, we are concerned about the role of professionals in the
Enron matter and other frauds on investors. While regulation of
accountants has been discussed extensively at the SEC, in
Congressional hearings and in the press, we believe that attention
should also be given to the role of lawyers in representing public
88
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then current ABA Model Rule 1.13 did not adequately protect the
investing public because it did not define a specific course of action for a
lawyer to take upon detecting fraud and other material violations. 9° The
letter urged congressional recognition of the need for the SEC to
promulgate ethics standards for corporate attorneys and to grant explicit
authority for the federalization of the rules of professional
responsibility. 91 On March 28, 2002, the then SEC General Counsel,
David M. Becker, responded by recognizing that the role that lawyers
played in securities fraud was a matter of public concern. 92 The letter
from the SEC explained that the power under Rule 102(e)93 to discipline
lawyers had not been exercised because of strong opposition from the
state bar that such proceedings were to be addressed and enforced by the
corresponding state court systems. 94
As a result of the exchange of letters, section 307 was introduced as
necessary to assure corporate accountability. 95 It was widely believed

corporations, and in particular to whether lawyers should inform a
client corporation's directors about violations of the securities laws.
We believe that, if senior management will not rectify a violation,
lawyers who are responsible for the corporation's securities
compliance work should be required to make such a report.
Id.
90
91

Id.
Id.
92 Strauss, supra note 88, at 5; Letter from David M. Becker, SEC General Counsel, to
Richard Painter, Harvard Law Professor (Mar. 28, 2002) (on file with the Valparaiso
University Law Review).
93 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (2002); see also Paul Gonson, The 1998 Amendment to SEC Rule
102(e) Will Withstand Judicial Scrutiny, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 609 (discussing the process and
the case law behind the SEC use of Rule 102(e) as authority to censure, suspend, or bar
professionals from appearing or practicing before it).
94 Strauss, supra note 88, at 5; see Letter from David M. Becker to Richard Painter, supra
note 92. Rule 102(e) was premised on the authority that with the SEC's general rulemaking power, it also had the inherent authority to protect and enforce the integrity of its
processes. GONSON, supra note 93, at 612. Because of the large amount of documents that
are required to be filed with the SEC on an annual basis and an inherent limitation on
manpower to review all filed documents, the SEC must rely on lawyers and accountants
opinions of compliance. Id. To a certain extent the SEC must rely on good faith. Id.
95
Strauss, supranote 88, at 5.
For some time, the SEC actually tried [to ensure that lawyers followed
the law] in the late 1970s and early 1980s. They brought legal actions
to enforce this basic responsibility of lawyers -the responsibility to
take steps to make sure corporate mangers didn't break the law and
harm shareholders in the process. If you find out that managers are
breaking the law, you must tell them to stop. If they won't stop, you
go to the board of directors, which represents the shareholders, and tell
them what is going on. If they won't act responsibly and in
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that lawyers involved with the Enron Corporation did not do enough to
alert its top managers of the scandals that eventually led to the collapse
of the corporation.96 Congress specifically found disturbing the limited

compliance with the law, then you go to the board and say something
has to be done; there is a violation of the law occurring. It is basically
going up the ladder, up the chain of command.
For years, the SEC recognized the principle that lawyers had a
legal responsibility to go up the ladder if they saw wrongdoing
occurring. But then they stopped. One of the reasons they stopped is
because there were a lot of protests coming from the organized bar.
With Enron and WorldCom, and all the other corporate misconduct
we have seen, it is again clear that corporate lawyers should not be left
to regulate themselves no more than accountants should be left to
regulate themselves. There has been a lot of debate, rhetoric, and
discussion-rightfully so-about the necessity about not "letting the
fox guard the chicken coop." The same is true with lawyers. This has
become clear through various acts of misconduct. The lawyers have
involvement and responsibility, and they also cannot be left to regulate
themselves.
In January, a bipartisan group of top securities lawyers and legal
ethics experts in the country wrote a letter to Harvey Pitt telling him it
was time for the SEC to enforce the up-the-ladder principle, as in the
past. Mr. Pitt's top lawyer said: We are not going to do anything. If
Congress wants something done, Congress should act. Then I wrote a
letter to Mr. Pitt in essence saying: We are ready to act here. Will you
help us in crafting legislation and working out this problem?
That was 3 weeks ago. As of now, I have not yet received a
response. The time has come for Congress to act.
148 CONG. REC. S6524, S6552 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Edwards). "This
amendment is designed to assure that attorneys are responsible for fully informing their
corporate client of evidence of material violations of Federal securities law. That is what
we are talking about through the whole accounting reform." Id. at S6554 (statement of Sen.
Enzi); see also Letter from the American Bar Association to Senator Paul S. Sarbanes (July
9 2
19, 2002), at http://www.abanet.org/po/adr/letters/107th/businessO7l O .htm (on file
with the Valparaiso University Law Review) (recommending that Congress revisit the
definitions and standards proposed in the amendment for regulating attorney conduct).
Attorneys are already subject to strict ethical rules adopted and
enforced by the state courts, and the ABA believes that the courts
should retain their traditional authority to govern lawyer conduct. All
attorneys are licensed by the highest court of the state in which they
practice and are subject to the ethical rules adopted by that court....
While lawyer disciplinary rules have been, and will continue to be,
periodically updated, these changes should be accomplished through
the orderly adoption of new state court rules. Regulation of lawyers
should remain the province of the judiciary, not the executive, and any
attempt to grant the ...SEC the power to adopt a set of national rules
would violate separation of powers principles.
Letter from the American Bar Association to Senator Paul S. Sarbanes, supra.
% Ellen Joan Pollok, Andersen: Called to Account: Enron Lawyers Face Congress Over Their
Role, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2002, at C13.
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scope of investigations that took place by in-house and outside counsel
upon receiving a letter of concern from an internal senior executive. 97 In
response, section 307 of the SOA mandates that the SEC promulgate
rules of professional responsibility for corporate lawyers. 98
This
sweeping new law required that the SEC promulgate the standards
within 180 days from enactment of the legislation. 99 Upon signing of the
bill, SEC Chairman Pitt expressed support for the toughening of lawyer
reporting requirements and stated that, where the state bars failed to
adequately enforce and discipline attorneys, the SEC was ready and now
obligated to step in.1°°

Id.; Michael Orey & Richard B. Schmitt, Enron Entangles Lawyers, WALL ST. J., May 8,
2002, at B1; see also Roger C. Crampton, Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: Professional
Responsibility Issues, in CORP. LAW 2002, at 841 (PLI Corp. Practice Course, Handbook Series
No. 1324, 2002) (describing the various roles played by attorneys and their alleged failures
of duties to investigate and protect the shareholders of the corporation).
98 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7245).
(1) requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation of
securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the
company or any agent thereof, to the chief legal counsel or the chief
executive officer of the company... and
(2) if the counsel or officer does not appropriatelyrespond to the evidence
(adopting, as necessary, appropriate remedial measures or sanctions
with respect to the violation), requiring the attorney to report the
evidence to the audit committee of the board of directors of the issuer
or to another committee of the board of directors comprised solely of
directors not employed directly or indirectly by the issuer, or to the
board of directors.
Id. (emphasis added).
9
Federal Law Requires New Lawyer Rules, 71 U.S. L. WK. 2079 (2002). A professor of law
called the rule "heavy-handed" and "not well thought through." Id. at 2080. This
professor, who is also a reporter for the ABA Task Force on Corporate Responsibility,
described the rule as:
[Niot nuanced or sensitive to the circumstances in which lawyers
practice before the commission and the relationships they have with
their corporate clients. A lawyer's decision to go to the chief legal
officer or the CEO should be a much more considered act than an
automatic reaction to "evidence" of a violation.
Id. Additionally, the professor of law described the rule as having a standard of a "hair
trigger" rather than "a thoughtful predicate for taking such a step." Id.
100 Matthew Haggman, The Lawyer as Snitch - New Federal Law Places Attorneys for Public
Companies in Tough Spot if They Suspect Clients Are Committing Fraud, PALM BEACH DAILY
Bus. REV., Sept. 23, 2002, at 6.
97
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On November 6, 2002, the SEC voted to release a proposal of the
standards of professional conduct in compliance with the SOA. 01' The
proposal included a provision for up-the-ladder reporting as mandated
by Congress.10 2 In addition, the SEC went a step further and included a
provision for required disclosure to the SEC and withdrawal if no
appropriate response is received by the organization. 10 3 Comments to
the proposed rule were invited and posted on the SEC website. 1°4 The
proposed rules received a flurry of responses, most notably criticizing
the SEC's proposed disclosure requirement.10 5 On January 23, 2003, the
SEC voted to adopt a set of final rules for up-the-ladder reporting which
varied from the proposed rules. 106 Additionally, the SEC voted to extend
the comment period for the controversial "noisy withdrawal"
07
provision.
The adopted up-the-ladder reporting rule requires that the attorney,
upon having credible evidence of a fraud, first report the material
violation to the chief legal officer ("CLO") and the CEO. 0 8 If no

101 Securities and Exchange Commission, Proposed Rule: Implementation of Standards of
Professional Conduct for Attorneys (proposed Nov. 18,
2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8150.html (last modified Dec. 17, 2002).
102 Securities and Exchange Commission, Implementation of Standards of Professional
Conduct
for
Attorneys
(proposed
Nov.
18,
2002),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8150.html (last modified Dec. 17, 2002) (Up-theLadder reporting rule) [hereinafter SEC Proposed Up-the-Ladder Rule].
103 Securities and Exchange Commission, Implementation of Standards of Professional
Conduct
for
Attorneys
(proposed
Nov.
18,
2002),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8150.htm (last modified Dec. 17, 2002) (Noisy
Withdrawal Rule) [hereinafter SEC Proposed Noisy Withdrawal Rule].
104 See supra note 101.
105
Tamara Loomis, 77 Big Firms Deliver Objection to Proposed Rules Implementing SarbanesOxley, BROWARD DAILY Bus. REV., Dec. 20, 2002, at A19; Press Release, American Bar
Association, ABA Urges SEC Not to Exceed Sarbanes-Oxley Mandate Without Extended
Comment Period (Dec. 18, 2002), at http://www.abanews.org/dec02/sec.htm; see also
Press Release, American Corporate Counsel Association, In-house Counsel Poll on
Corporate Scandals (Oct. 21, 2002), at http://www.acca.com/about/pr-archive.php
(showing that most in-house counsel define their corporate cultures ethically responsible
and half the respondents found Section 307 unnecessary because of self-regulation and the
other half found the legislation necessary to assist in preventing and disclosing financial
fraud).
106 Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 17 C.F.R. pt. 205
(2003); see also SEC Lets CorporationsOff the Hook, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Jan. 27, 2003, at A8;
Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Adopts Attorney Conduct Rule
Under Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Jan. 23, 2003), at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/200313.htm [hereinafter SEC Adopts Attorney Conduct Rule].
107 SEC Adopts Attorney Conduct Rule, supra note 106.
108 lmplementaion of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 17 C.F.R. § 205.3.
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(a) Representingan Issuer. An attorney appearing and practicing before
the Commission in the representation of an issuer owes his or her
professional and ethical duties to the issuer as an organization. That
the attorney may work with and advise the issuer's officers, directors,
or employees in the course of representing the issuer does not make
such individuals the attorney's clients.
(b) Duty to report evidence of a materialviolation.
(1) If an attorney, appearing and practicing before the Commission in
the representation of an issuer, becomes aware of evidence of a
material violation by the issuer or by any officer, director, employee, or
agent of the issuer, the attorney shall report such evidence to the
issuer's chief legal officer .. . or to both the issuer's chief legal officer
and its chief executive officer ....
(2) The chief legal officer ... shall cause such inquiry into the evidence
of a material violation as he or she reasonably believes is appropriate
to determine whether the material violation described in the report has
occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur. If the chief legal officer ...
determines no material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about
to occur, he or she shall notify the reporting attorney and advise the
reporting attorney of the basis for such determination. Unless the chief
legal officer ... reasonably believes that no material violation has
occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur, he or she shall take all
reasonable steps to cause the issuer to adopt an appropriate response,
and shall advise the reporting attorney thereof. In lieu of causing an
inquiry ...a chief legal officer ... may refer a report of evidence of a
material violation to a qualified legal compliance committee ...if the
issuer has duly established a qualified legal compliance committee
prior to the report of evidence of a material violation.
(3) Unless an attorney who has made a report ...reasonably believes
that the chief legal officer or the chief executive officer ... has
provided an appropriate response within a reasonable time, the
attorney shall report the evidence. . . to:
(i) The audit committee of the issuer's board of directors;
(ii) Another committee of the issuer's board of directors ...who are
not... "interested persons" . ..or
(iii) The issuer's board of directors ....
(8) An attorney who receives what he or she reasonably believes is an
appropriate and timely response to a report he or she made ...need
do nothing more under this section with respect to his or her report.
(9) An attorney who does not reasonably believe that the issuer has
made an appropriate response within a reasonable time ... [the
attorney] shall explain his or her reasons therefor to the chief legal
officer .. ., chief executive officer .. ., and directors to whom the
attorney reported the evidence of a material violation ....
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appropriate response is given, then the attorney is to report the evidence
to the audit committee or the qualified legal compliance committee
("QLCC") based on the structure adopted by the corporation.1° 9
The proposed rule for "noisy withdrawal" requires an attorney to
take further action when she does not receive an appropriate response
from the corporation and believes that the material violation is ongoing,
or about to occur, and is likely to result in substantial injury to the
corporation or its shareholders.' 0 The proposed rule requires the

109

Id. § 205.3(c).
(c) Alternative reportingproceduresfor attorneys retained or employed by an
issuer that has established a qualified legal compliance committee.
(1) If an attorney, appearing and practicing before the Commission in
the representation of an issuer, becomes aware of evidence of a
material violation by the issuer or by any officer, director, employee, or
agent of the issuer, the attorney may, as an alternative to the reporting
requirements of ... this section, report such evidence to a qualified
legal compliance committee, if the issuer has previously formed such a
committee. An attorney who reports evidence of a material violation
to such a qualified legal compliance committee has satisfied his or her
obligation to report such evidence and is not required to assess the
issuer's response to the reported evidence of a material violation.
(2) A chief legal officer ... may refer a report of evidence of a material
violation to a previously established qualified legal compliance
committee in lieu of causing an inquiry to be conducted .... The chief
legal officer ... shall inform the reporting attorney that the report has
been referred to a qualified legal compliance committee. Thereafter,
pursuant to [this rule], the qualified legal compliance committee shall
be responsible for responding to the evidence of a material violation

Id. § 205.2(k). "Qualified legal compliance committee means a committee of an issuer ... that:
(1) Consists of at least one member of the issuer's audit committee ... and two or more
members of the issuer's board of directors who are not employed, directly or indirectly, by
the issuer.... " Id.
110 SEC Proposed Noisy Withdrawal Rule, supra note 103, § 205.3(d).
(d) Notice to the Commission where there is no appropriate response
within a reasonable time.
(1) Where an attorney who has reported evidence of a material
violation ... does not receive an appropriate response, or has not
received a response in a reasonable time, to his or her report, and the
attorney reasonably believes that a material violation is ongoing or is
about to occur and is likely to result in substantial injury to the
financial interest or property of the issuer or of investors:
(i) An attorney retained by the issuer shall:
(A) Withdraw forthwith from representing the issuer, indicating that
the withdrawal is based on professional considerations;
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attorney to withdraw from representation, notify the SEC of withdrawal
by citing to "professional considerations," and then disaffirm any
materially false or misleading documents that were prepared or
reviewed by the attorney.'11 The Commission states that such "extreme

(B) Within one business day of withdrawing, give written notice to the
Commission of the attorney's withdrawal, indicating that the
withdrawal was based on professional considerations; and
(C) Promptly disaffirm to the Commission any opinion, document,
affirmation, representation, characterization, or the like in a document
filed with or submitted to the Commission, or incorporated into such a
document, that the attorney has prepared or assisted in preparing and
that the attorney reasonably believes is or may be materially false or
misleading;
(ii) An attorney employed by the issuer shall:
(A) Within one business day, notify the Commission in writing that he
or she intends to disaffirm some opinion, document, affirmation,
representation, characterization, or the like in a document filed or
submitted to the Commission, or incorporated into such a document,
that the attorney has prepared or assisted in preparing and that the
attorney reasonably believes is or may be materially false or
misleading; and
(B) Promptly disaffirm to the Cornnission, in writing, any such
opinion, document, affirmation, representation, characterization, or the
like; and
(iii)
The issuer's chief legal officer ... shall inform any attorney
retained or employed to replace the attorney who has so withdrawn
that the previous attorney's withdrawal was based on professional
considerations.
Id. On January 29, the SEC released an additional proposal that called for the corporation
to notify the SEC and disaffirm any tainted documents upon a lawyer withdrawing.
Securities Exchange Commission, ProposedRule: Implementation of Standards of Professional
Conduct
for
Attorneys
(proposed
Jan.
29,
2003),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8186.htm
(last modified Sept. 26, 2003)
(Corporation Notification rule) [hereinafter SEC Proposed Corporation Notification Rule].
This proposed rule still requires the lawyer to notify the corporation and formally
withdraw from the engagement and discontinue any attorney-client relationships. Id.
However, this proposed rule would not require the attorney to notify the SEC. Id. In the
alternative, the proposed section 205.3(e) provides:
(e)Duties of an issuer where an attorney has given notice [to the
corporation].
(1) Where an attorney has provided an issuer with a written notice...
the issuer shall, within two business days of receipt of such written
notice, report such notice and the circumstances related thereto on
[specified compliance forms with the SEC], as applicable.
Id. This rule proposal is beyond the scope of this Note, however, more information
regarding the scope of the proposed rule and commentary is available at the SEC website.
MI Compare SEC Proposed Noisy Withdrawal Rule, supra note 103, § 205.3(d) (requiring
the attorney to notify the SEC directly upon withdrawal of an attorney-client relationship
due to professional considerations), with SEC Proposed Corporation Notification Rule,
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situations" that mandate disclosure will be rare. 112 An in-house attorney
would have the same obligations as outside counsel except the attorney
would not have to resign from his position.1 3 The attorney would14 still
be required to notify the SEC and disaffirm any tainted documents1
However, the SEC sets up a slightly different procedure for
corporations that have established a QLCC. 115 In situations where the
corporation has formed a QLCC, the committee would be authorized to
require that the corporation take remedial actions to correct a "material
violation."1 6 If the corporation does not take remedial action upon

supra note 110, § 205.3(e) (requiring the corporation to disclose instances where an attorney
has ended an attorney-client relationship for professional considerations). The proposed
Noisy Withdrawal Rule is similar to the ABA Model Rule 1.6 in that it requires disclosure.
However the ABA Model Rules require disclosure to the court while the SEC "Noisy
Withdrawal" Rule requires disclosure to the SEC. For the purposes of this paper, "noisy
withdrawal" refers to notifying the SEC and disaffirming relevant documents to the SEC.
SEC Proposed Noisy Withdrawal Rule, supra note 103.
112
113
Id.
114
Id.
Id., § 205.20).
115
Id. § 205.20)(2)-(4). A QLCC is a committee that:
116
(2) Has been duly established by the issuer's board of directors and
authorized to investigate any report of evidence of a material violation
by the issuer, its officers, directors, employees or agents;
(3) Has established written procedures for the confidential receipt,
retention, and consideration of any report of evidence of a material
violation...;
(4) Has the authority and responsibility:
(i) To inform the issuer's chief legal officer and chief executive officer
...of any report of evidence of a material violation...;
(ii) To decide whether an investigation is necessary to determine
whether the material violation described in the report has occurred, is
occurring, or is about to occur and, if so, to:
(A) Notify the audit committee or the full board of directors;
(B) Initiate an investigation, which may be conducted either by the
chief legal officer.., or by outside attorneys; and
(C) Retain such additional expert personnel as the committee deems
necessary; and
(iii) At the conclusion of any such investigation...:
(A) Direct the issuer to adopt appropriate remedial measures,
including appropriate disclosures, and/or to impose appropriate
sanctions to stop any material violation that is occurring, prevent any
material violation that is about to occur, and/or rectify any material
violation that has already occurred; and
(B) Inform the chief legal officer and the chief executive officer.., and
the board of directors of the results of any such investigation ... and
the appropriate remedial measures to be adopted....
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notification of the QLCC, then each member of the QLCC is required to
11 7
notify and inform the SEC of any tainted filings and documents.
Additionally, an outside attorney would not be required to make a
"noisy withdrawal" and an in-house attorney would not be required to
notify the SEC or disaffirm any tainted filings.1 18
Both of these
provisions, the adopted up-the-ladder reporting rule and the proposed
disclosure rules, have been fraught with controversy because of the
possible conflict with the already existing body of state law in
Professional Conduct. 119

117

Id. § 205.20)(5).
Each member of which individually, together with the issuer's chief
legal officer and the chief executive officer ... individually, has the
authority and responsibility, in the event the issuer fails in any
material respect to take any of the remedial measures that the qualified
legal compliance committee has directed the issuer to take, to notify
the Commission that a material violation has occurred, is occurring, or
is about to occur and to disaffirm in writing any document submitted
to or filed with the Commission by the issuer that the individual
member of the qualified legal compliance committee or the chief legal
officer or the chief executive officer reasonably believes is false or
materially misleading.

Id.
118 Id. § 205.3(c).

(c) Alternative reporting procedures for attorneys retained or
employed by an issuer with a qualified legal compliance committee.
(1) If, in appearing and practicing before the Commission in the
representation of an issuer, an attorney becomes aware of evidence of a
material violation by the issuer or by any officer, director, employee, or
agent of the issuer, the attorney may, as an alternative to the [up the
ladder] reporting requirements ...of this section, report such evidence
of a material violation to a qualified legal compliance conunittee, if the
issuer has duly formed such a committee....
[An attorney who
reports evidence of a material violation to a qualified legal compliance
committee has satisfied his or her obligation to report evidence of a
material violation with the issuer, is not required to assess the issuer's
response to the reported evidence of a material violation, and is not
required to take any action under ...regarding the evidence of a
material violation.
Id.
See Roberta S. Karmel, A Bid to Regulate the Entire Bar, 228 N.Y. L.J. 3 (2002); Fredrick
K. Koenen, Sarbanes-Oxley and the SEC: New Dilemnmas for Attorneys, 3 WHITE-COLLAR
CRIME REP. 17 (2002). Many criticize the SEC rule as one that goes to far and is "riddled
with numerous faulty judgments." Karmel, supra. Additionally, there is a question of how
the proposed standards will protect investors from frauds like Enron. Id. Others believe
that the SEC is forcing attorneys to be governmental actors by reporting information to the
SEC, a governmental entity, without permission from the client. Id.
119
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D. Tie State ControlledArea of Attorney ProfessionalConduct
Historically, the area of regulating lawyer conduct has been vested
with the states. 20 The evolution of attorney ethics regulations, in
general, reflects a steady increase of requirements and enforcement
standards.121 Initially, several states passed statutes that allowed any
registered voter to practice law without any stated regulation on
attorney behavior.122 Then came a tightening of the bar requirements,
123
bar entry, and eventually restrictions on attorney conduct.
Client confidence has been recognized as a crucial part of the
evolution of the legal profession and rules governing conduct.1 24
Proponents of the confidentiality rule suggest that without such
confidence, and even more closely guarded attorney-client privileges,
clients' interests would not necessarily be forthcoming and attorneys
2
would not adequately be protected from liability against third parties. 5
Opponents of the broad confidentiality rule suggest that regulations that
focus on the attorney-client confidences are to the "detriment of
opponents and society at large." 126 The Supreme Court found that the

See David B. Wilkins, How Should We Determine Who Should Regulate Lawyers? Managing Conflict and Context in Professional Regulation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 465, 467-68
(1996). The area of professional regulation has grown to where now a large number of
institutions seek to control attorney conduct in some form. Id. at 467. Because of the large
amount of tasks that lawyers take part in, the area of regulation will continue to be one of
great controversy. Id.
121 Benjamin Hoorn Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?: An Economic Analysis of the
Justificationsfor Entry and Conduct Regulation, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429, 429-33 (2001). There are
two separate bodies of attorney regulation, entry regulation and conduct regulation. Id.
122 Id. Some states had nominal requirements but they were rarely enforced. Id.
123 Id. Initially the regulations passed to govern lawyers were considered stated ethical
norms. Id. at 430. Increasingly, the standards have transformed to minimum standards of
allowable attorney conduct. Id. at 431. Additionally, the requirements for practicing law
have grown to include extensive educational requirements, a bar exam, and a fitness
review. Id.
120

124 Id. at 467-68.

125 See id. at 470-75. It is argued that the confidentiality rule serves the public interest by
encouraging clients to consult attorneys. Id. at 473-75. In doing so, the attorney is able to
guide the client into making better, legal decisions and even correct a wrong done by
society to the client, i.e., employer negligence. Id. at 478-80.
126 Id. at 473. It is argued that "[1Jawyers ...have considerable latitude in dealing with
omissions of material facts or the presentation of questionable or even perjured evidence,
and multiple commentators have complained that the regulations undersell candor for the
good of the clients." Id. See generally David S. Caudill, Ethical Guidelines on Attorney-Client
Confidentiality: Sympathy for the Devil?: Reflections on the Crime-Fraud Exception to Client
Confidentiality, 8 ST. JOHN'S J.L. COMM. 369 (1993) (discussing the clash between client
confidentiality and fraud disclosure requirements).
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purpose of client confidentiality is to encourage candid communications
between the attorney and the client to "thereby promote broader public
127
interests in the observance of the law and administration of justice."
The balancing of the attorney-client confidentiality against disclosure
to avoid frauds, bodily harm, or other illegal activities has been a longtime challenge facing the legal profession. 128 Rules on the scope of
attorney-client privilege, confidences, and disclosure requirements vary
129
by state.
ABA Model Rule 1.6 states that a lawyer shall not reveal any
130
information gained during representation unless the client consents.
The ABA Rule, as amended in August of 2003, allows for, but does not
require, attorney disclosure to prevent the client from committing an
illegal act that is likely to result in "imminent death or substantial bodily

Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). Client confidentiality has been described
as the "hallmark" of the legal profession as an obligation to represent their client with
undivided zeal while not divulging secrets obtained through representation. Valerie
Breslin & Jeff Dooley, Whistle Blowing v. Confidentiality: Can Circumstances Mandate
Attorneys to Expose Their Clients?, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 719, 719 (2002).
128
Caudill, supra note 126, at 371. The balance tips in favor of attorney-client privilege
because this relationship is "paramount." Id. "[Tihe dialectical tension between client
confidentiality and disclosure of client fraud is inescapable." Id.; William F. Dietrich, Legal
and Ethical Issues for Attorneys Dealing with Financial Data: Heightened Scrutiny After the
Enron and Andersen Debacle, in CORP. LAW 2002, at 925, 955-64 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice
Course, Handbook Series No. 1325, 2002).
129 Breslin & Dooley, supra note 127, at 722-23; see infra notes 131-35 and accompanying
text.
130 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2003).
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation
of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is
impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation or the
disclosure is permitted by [the exceptions noted in this rule].
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a
client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is
reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial
interests to property of another and in furtherance of which the client
has used or is using the lawyer's services;
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial
interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or
has resulted from the client's commission of a crime or fraud in
furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer's services;
(4) to secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these
Rules....
127
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harm" or to prevent a client from committing a fraud that may result in
financial injury to others. 31 The ABA Model Rules also require the client
fraud to be revealed if committed on a tribunal. 32 Some states require

ld.; Some states had already taken this step to allow for disclosure for future financial
harms. See TEX. SUP. CT. R. 1.05.
(a) "Confidential information" includes both "privileged information"
and "unprivileged client information." "Privileged information" refers
to the information of a client protected by the lawyer-client privilege
... "Unprivileged client information" means all information relating to
a client or furnished by the client, other than privileged information,
acquired by the lawyer during the course or by reason of the
representation of the client.
131

(c) A lawyer may reveal confidential information:
(1) When the lawyer has been expressly authorized to do so in order to
carry out representation.
(4) When the lawyer has reason to believe it is necessary to do so in
order to comply with a court order, a Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct, or other law.
(7) When the lawyer has reason to believe it is necessary to do so in
order to prevent the client from committing a criminal of fraudulent
act.
(8) To the extent revelation reasonably appears necessary to rectify the
consequences of a client's criminal or fraudulent act in the commission
of which the lawyer's services had been used.
Id. Enron was headquartered in Texas, where attorneys are permitted to disclose a
financial crime or fraud. In February of 2000, the ABA House of delegates rejected
proposed amendments to ABA Model Rule 1.6 that would allow disclosure in instances if
criminal or fraudulent acts that are likely to result in substantial financial injury of the
interests of another. James H. Cheek & Derek S. Hughey, Emerging Responsibilities and
Liabilities of a Corporate Lawyer, in CORP. LAw 2002, 1141, 1150 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice
Course, Handbook Series No. 1343, 2002). The ABA House of Delegates eventually
approved the revised rule in August of 2003. Press Release, American Bar Association,
ABA Adopts New Lawyers Ethics Rules, Urges Fairness in Military Commission Trials
(Aug. 12, 2003), at http://www.abanet.org/media/aug03/81203 1.html.
132 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2002).
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal...;
(2) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling
jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position
of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or
(3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer, the
lawyer's client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material
evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall
take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure
to the tribunal.
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disclosure of client's acts if a client discloses an intention to commit
fraud and the attorney is unable to talk the client out if it. 133 Other states
permit or require disclosure to rectify a substantial loss resulting from a
34
client crime or fraud in which the client used the lawyer's services.1

FLA. Sup. CT. R. 4-1.6.
(a) Consent Required to Reveal Information. A lawyer shall not
reveal information relating to representation of a client except as
[follows], unless the client consents after disclosure to the client.
(b) When Lawyer Must Reveal Information. A lawyer shall reveal
such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary:
(1) to prevent a client from committing a crime ....
Id.; N.J. SUP. CT. R. 1.6; VA. SUP. CT. R. 1.6; Wis. Sup. CT. R. 20:1.6; see infra notes 134-35 and
accompanying text.
I'
COLO. SUP. CT. R. 1.6.
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation
of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for
disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out
representation, and except [as follows] ...
(b) A lawyer may reveal the intention of the lawyer's client to commit
a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime.
Id.; see also CONN. SUP. CT. R. 1.6.
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a
client unless he client consents after consultation, except for
disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation, and except [as follows]:
(b) A lawyer shall reveal such information to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary to prevent the client from committing a
criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in death or
substantial bodily harm.
(c) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary to:
(1) Prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer
believes is likely to result in substantial injury to the financial interest
or property of another;
(2) Rectify the consequences of a client's criminal or fraudulent act in
the commission of which the lawyer's services had been used.
CONN. SUP. CT. R. 1.6; see IND. SUP. CT. R. 1.6.
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a
client unless the client consents after consultation, except for
disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out
representation, and except as [follows]:
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary:
(1) To prevent the client from committing any criminal act ....
IND. SuP. CT. R. 1.6; see OHIO SuP. CT. R. 4-101.
(a) "Confidence" refers to information protected by the attorney-client
privilege under applicable law, and "secret" refers to other
information gained in the professional relationship that the client has
133
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Further, some states have mandatory disclosure requirements for
35
financial crimes.

requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be
embarrassing or would likely to be detrimental to the client.
(c) A lawyer may reveal:
(1) Confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients
affected, but only after full disclosure to them.
(3) The intention of his client to commit a crime and the information
necessary to prevent the crime.
OHIO SUP. CT. R. 4-101; see also ALA. SUP. CT. R. 1.6; ARIZ. SUP. CT. E.R. 1.6; ARK. SuP. CT. R.
1.6; FLA. SUP. CT. R. 4-1.6; GA. SUP. CT. R. 1.6; HAW. SUP. CT. R. 1.6; IDAHO SUP. CT. R. 1.6; ILL.
SUP. CT. R. 1.6; IOWA Sup. CT. R. 4-101; KAN. SUP. CT. R. 1.6; MASS. SuP. CT.R.1.6; MD.SUP.
CT. R. 1.6; ME. SuP. CT. R. 3.6; MICH. SUP. CT. R. 1.6; MINN. SUP. CT. R. 1.6; MISS. SUP. CT. R.
1.6; NEB. SUP. CT. R. 4-101; NEV. SUP. CT. R. 1.6; N.H. Sup. CT. R. 1.6; N.J. SuP. CT. R. 1.6; N.M.
SUP. CT. R. 1.6; N.Y. Sup. CT. R. 1.6; N.C. SUP. CT. R. 1.6; N.D. SUP. CT. R. 1.6; OKLA. SUP. CT.
R. 1.6; OR. SuP. CT. R. 4-101; PA. SUP. CT. R. 1.6; S.C. SUP. CT. R. 1.6; TENN. SUP. CT. R. 4-101;
TEX. SUP. CT. R. 1.05; UTAH SUP. CT. R. 1.6; VT. SUP. CT. R. 1.6; VA. SUP. CT. R. 1.6; WASH. SUP.
CT. R. 1.6; W. VA. Sup. CT. R. 1.6; Wis. Sup. CT. R. 20:1.6; WYo. SUP. CT. R. 1.6.
135 Tamara Loomis, New Disclosure Rule, An ABA Proposal Would Have Lawyers "Rat" on
Clients, 228 N.Y. L.J. 5 (2002). A study shows that lawyers in the states that carried the
provision ignored the mandatory financial disclosure rule. Id.; see N.J. SUP. CT. R. 1.6.
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a
client unless the client consents after consultation, except for
disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation, and except as [follows]:
(b) A lawyer shall reveal such information to the proper authorities, as
soon as, and to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary, to
prevent the client:
(1) from committing a criminal, illegal or fraudulent act that the lawyer
reasonably believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily
harm or substantial injury to the financial interest or property of
another.
N.J. Sup. CT. R. 1.6; see WIS. SUP. CT. R. 20:1.6.
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a
client unless the client unless the client consents after consultation,
except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized to carry out the
representation, and except as [follows].

(b) A lawyer shall reveal such information to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary to prevent the client from committing a
criminal or fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely
to result in death or in substantial injury to the financial interest or
property of another.
Wis. Sup. CT. R. 20:1.6; see VA. SUP. CT. R. 1.6.
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information protected by the attorneyclient privilege under applicable law or other information gained in
the professional relationship that the client has requested be held in
inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would
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Attorney-client privilege, a sub-set of confidentiality, generally does
not allow the holder of the privilege to disclose positive or helpful
privileged information and then invoke the privilege as to the remaining
facts or portions surrounding the previous disclosure. 136
Upon
disclosure of privileged information to a third party, privilege is
considered waived, regardless of the intent of the communication or
intent of the client or attorney. 137 Some courts have recognized a limited
waiver approach in situations where a corporation has voluntarily
disclosed privileged information to government agencies. 138
This

be likely be detrimental to the client unless the client consents after
consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in
order to carry out the representation, and except as [follows].
(b) To the extent a lawyer reasonably believes necessary, the lawyer
may reveal:
(3) such information which clearly establishes that the client has, in the
course of the representation, perpetrated upon a third party a fraud
related to the subject matter of the representation;
(c) A lawyer shall promptly reveal:
(1) [Tihe intention of a client, as stated by the client, to comnmit a crime
and the information necessary to prevent the crime, but before
revealing such information, the attorney shall, where feasible, advise
the client of possible legal consequences of the action, urge the client
not to commit the crime, and advise the client that the attorney must
reveal the client's criminal intention unless thereupon abandoned ....
VA. Sup. CT. R. 1.6. But see ILL. SuP. CT. R. 1.6.
(a) Except when required ... or permitted ...

a lawyer shall not,

during or after termination of the professional relationship with the
client, use or reveal a confidence or secret of the client known to the
lawyer unless the client consents after disclosure.
(b) A lawyer shall reveal information about a client to the extent it
appears necessary to prevent the client from committing an act that
would result in death or serious bodily harm.
(c) A lawyer may use or reveal:
(1) confidences or secrets when permitted under these Rules or
required by law or court order;
(2) the intention of a client to commit a crime ....
Id.
136

2 ATT'Y-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE U.S. § 9:28 (2003).

137 Id. Often courts look to fairness in determining the scope and level of the waiver. Id.
The level of disclosure, nature of disclosure, when, where, and to whom disclosure was
made are all factors, among others, that the court considers. Id.; see also Martin P. Hicks,
Limited Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege Upon Voluntary Disclosure to the SEC, 50
FORDHAM L. REV. 963, 968-70 (1982).
138 25A SEC. PRAC. FED. & STATE ENFORCEMENT § 11:18 (2003); COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS &

CORP. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 5:33 (2003). For the purposes of this Note, the attorney-
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approach recognizes that voluntary disclosure to the SEC would not
constitute a general waiver; therefore, the corporation could still invoke
privilege as to other parties. 139 However, other courts have held that this
constitutes a general waiver and attorney-client privilege is waived as to
140
other third parties.
The premise of confidentiality and privilege extends to organizations
as clients. The current ABA Model Rule 1.13(b) provides for an attorney
to exercise discretion in how to handle fraud and other criminal
wrongdoing in an organization, as long as she is acting reasonably in the
best interest of her client. 141 In addition, the ABA Rule 1.13 allows an

client privilege is used in the context of the required disclosure of confidential information
to the SEC that would otherwise be protected as attorney-client privilege in court.
139 25A SEC. PRAC. FED. & STATE ENFORCEMENT § 11:18 (2003); see Diversified Indus., Inc.
v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1977) (en banc) (reasoning that a corporation faced
with a general waiver as to privileged information upon disclosure to the SEC would not
conduct internal investigations, rectify situations of internal misconduct, or would even
invoke privilege towards the SEC thereby frustrating corporate compliance which
eventually hurts shareholders and future investors); Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D.
679, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (reasoning that voluntary disclosures to governmental agencies
should be encouraged rather that discouraged by forcing corporations to fight disclosure in
order to protect attorney-client privilege); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated July 13, 1979,
478 F. Supp. 368 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (reasoning that to hold voluntary disclosure to the SEC
would constitute a general waiver would lead to substantially fewer corporations
cooperating with the SEC). See generally Hicks, supra note 137 (discussing the extent of the
waiver privilege and court interpretations).
140 In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig. v. Columbia/HCA
Healthcare Corp., 293 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that a corporation could not
selectively waive attorney-client privilege to governmental organizations while trying
assert the privilege as to other parties); Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (finding that disclosure to the SEC resulted in a general waiver); Teachers Ins. &
Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Shamrock Broad. Co., 521 F. Supp. 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding
that unless reservation of privilege is made, disclosure results in a general waiver); see
Hicks, supra, note 137, at 984-85.
141

Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (b) (2003),

(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows than an officer, employee or
other person associated with the organization is engaged in action,
intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation
that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a
violation of a law that reasonably might be imputed to the
organization, and is likely to result in substantial injury to the
organization, the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the
best interest of the organization. Unless the lawyer reasonably
believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the organization
to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in the
organization, including, if warranted by the circumstances, to the
highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization ....
With, MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (b) (2002),
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attorney to consider the "seriousness of the violation." 142 The ABA
Disciplinary Rules provide that attorneys must have information "clearly
establishing" that their client's conduct is fraudulent in nature before
143
taking any remedial action.
Congress, in enacting the SOA, granted broad discretion to the SEC
in promulgating the standards that trigger reporting, regulating internal
disclosure, and enforcing rules of conduct for corporate attorneys. 144
Therefore, corporate attorneys will likely face conflict between the stateimposed ethical regulations and the new SEC promulgated attorney

(b) In determining how to proceed, the lawyer shall give due
consideration to the seriousness of the violation and its consequences,
the scope and nature of the lawyers representation, the responsibility
in the organization, and the apparent motivation of the person
involved ... Any measures taken shall be designed to minimize
disruption of the organization and the risk of revealing information
relating to the representation to persons outside the organization.
Such measures may include among others:
(1) asking reconsideration of the matter;
(2) advising that a separate legal opinion on the matter be sought for
presentation to appropriate authority in the organization; and
(3) referring the matter to higher authority in the organization,
including, if warranted by the seriousness of the matter, referred to the
highest authority that can act in behalf of the organization ....
See also Susanna M. Kim, Dual Identities and Dueling Obligations: Preserving Independence in
Corporate Representation, 68 TENN. L. REV. 179 (2001). The first Canons of Professional
Conduct adopted by the ABA in 1908, had no reference to organizations as clients. Id. at
188. It was not until 1969, when the ABA Model Code was adopted, was there a minor
reference to an organization as a client. Id. at 189. It was only once the Model Rules were
adopted by the ABA to replace the Model Code did Rule 1.13 offer guidance to lawyers on
their ethical duties in representing an organization as a client. Id. at 189-90.
142 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) cmt. 4 (2003); Kim, supra note 141, at 8990.
143 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT DR 7-102 (2002).
(B) A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:
(1) His client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a
fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to
rectify the same, and if client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall
reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal, except when the
information is protected as a privileged communication.
Id.
144 Anandarajah, supra note 5, at A3. Some commentators believe this was in reaction to
the involvement of the Vinson & Elkins law firm in the Enron debacle and Simpson
Thacher & Bartlett in the Global Crossing debacle. Id.; see Arthur D. Burger, Lawyers as
WA/histleblowers, How Increased SEC Oversight of the Bar Could Change the Client Relationship, 25
LEGAL TIMES 22 (2002). The definition of the event that triggers the disclosure is that of a
higher standard than the former ABA Rule 1.13. Id. More discretion is allowed to the
attorney to consider under the former ABA rules. Id.
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conduct standards. A lawyer subject to conflicting ethical duties will not
be able to properly guard against corporate fraud; therefore, the state
and the SEC standard must be reconcilable to effectuate the public
interest of investor protection. 145 Additionally, the increased standards
for attorney disclosure to prevent corporate fraud provide little
146
protection for management abuses the law was intended to thwart.
An analysis of the SEC ethical standards, state-imposed ethical duties,
and attorney-client confidentiality standards will demonstrate the
conflict and impracticalities faced by corporate attorneys and the need
for a reconcilable ethical disclosure standard.
III. AN ANALYSIS OF A CORPORATE LAWYER'S CONFLICrING DuTIES

This Part analyzes the scope of the SEC promulgated rules in light of
the congressional mandate of SOA. The conflict between the scope of the
up-the-ladder reporting scheme, as interpreted by the SEC promulgated
ethics rules, and the state bar ethics standards are analyzed first. Next,
this Part analyzes the legislative intent and the congressional authority
explicitly granted by the SOA to the SEC. Finally, the conflict between
the SEC "noisy withdrawal" requirement, the role of lawyers in
corporate compliance, and attorney-client privilege are analyzed.
A.

Mhich Lawyers Have a Duty to Report Under the SEC Promulgated Upthe-Ladder ReportingRule?
For the sake of investors and regular employees, ordinary
shareholders, we have to make sure that not only the
executives and the accountants do what they are responsible
for doing, but also that the lawyers do what they are
responsiblefor doing as members of the bar and as citizens of
147
the country.

Up-the-ladder reporting, as currently promulgated by the SEC,
places attorneys in a perplexing situation. Criticisms of the SEC rule
concern the expansive scope of attorneys that would be considered "to
be practicing" within the jurisdiction of the Commission and the
standard for material violations that would trigger up-the-ladder

145
146
147

See infra Part I.A-B.
See infra Part III.A-B.
148 Cong. Rec. S6524, S6551 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Sarbanes).
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disclosure.1 48 All attorneys, no matter their specialty or client, are faced
with dual loyalties, in that they must advocate for their client and abide
by the ethics standards laid out by the state bar. 149 The SEC mandated
up-the-ladder reporting places an affirmative duty on lawyers and does
not properly define triggering standards or to whom the duties will
apply.',
Attorneys must be aware of their duties to better serve the
151
public interest of detecting and preventing fraud within organizations.
Finally, the SEC up-the-ladder reporting rule, as currently defined, falls
152
outside the legislative intent and authority of the SOA.
1.

Expansive Scope of the SEC Rule Conflicts with Existing State
Standards

For a lawyer to serve the public interest, she must know to whom
she owes a duty. 1 53 Generally, the legal profession does not reward
attorneys for taking positions adverse to their clients.154 One view finds
that most often, clients will not choose to stay with an attorney who they
see as "policing the client's baser instincts."155 Instead, it is thought that
society is better served by preserving client confidentiality by not forcing
clients to choose to hide the wrongdoing so as to allow the attorney an
opportunity to dissuade them from the wrongdoing15 6 Another view
finds that it is possible to strike a balance between allowing a client
access to an attorney and protecting others from the harm of their client,

148 Terry Carter, Going Before the SEC, ABA, Others Criticize ProposedLawyer Regs, A.B.A. J.

E-REPORT, Dec. 20, 2002, at 1; Karmel, supra note 119, at 3. But see letter from Deborah
Pastor, eRaider.com, Inc., to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (Dec. 3, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/S74502/dpastorl.htm.
In my view, the Commission is acting not only under power delegated
by Congress, but as a representative of investors. I have no doubt that
the overwhelming majority of investors would vote in favor of this
rule for an individual company, if it were submitted as a shareholder
proposal ....[tiherefore, it is only defects in the corporate governance
process that prevent this rule from being in force already.
Id.
149 See infra text accompanying notes 153-215.
150 See infra text accompanying notes 178-202.
151 See infra text accompanying notes 153-215.
152 See infra text accompanying notes 219-33.
153 See Harry I. Subin, The Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences to Prevent
Harm, 70 IOWA L. REV. 1091, 1097 (1985).
154

Id.

155

Id.

Id. The instrumentalist argument contends that the possibility of an attorney joining
in or tolerating the misconduct is more tolerable than forcing clients to not reveal their
wrong-doing. Id.
156
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even if the attorney must disclose confidential client information. 157 This
same conflict also is prevalent for business attorneys in a corporate
context.
The first issue for a corporate attorney is to clearly identify the
client. 158 Based on the entity theory of representation, ABA Model Rule
1.13 of Professional Conduct states that the client is the corporate entity
itself, which is authorized to "[act] through its ... constituents." 15 9
Comment 1 to ABA Model Rule 1.13 defines the organization as a legal
entity, which can only act through its constituents, officers, directors,
employees, and shareholders. 160 Generally, a corporate lawyer can look
to the senior executive officers to speak for the entity. 161 A lawyer
looking to the corporate executives to speak for the corporate entity
usually does not pose a problem until the interests of the officers and the
corporation diverge. 62 An example of where the interests diverge occurs

157 Id. Often the disclosure rules are enacted to deal with certain specialty predicaments
and no serious reevaluation is undertaken to evaluate the effectiveness. Id. at 1098. For
example, securities field writers encounter a special conflict between preserving
confidentiality and an obligation to disclose relevant facts to investors and the SEC. Id. at
1099.
158 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Ethical Dilenmmas of Corporate Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1011, 1013
(1997); see also John M. Burman, Representing OrganizationsPart 1, 25 WYO. LAW. 37, 37-41
(2002). There are three critical aspects that a lawyer must consider when representing an
organization. Id. The lawyer must identify (1) the organization as a client, (2) the persons
authorized to speak for the organization, and (3) potential conflicts between individuals
representing the company and the company itself. Id.
159 Kim, supra note 141, at 180; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2003)
("A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting
through its duly authorized constituents.").
16

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 1 (2003).

[1] An organizational client is a legal entity, but it cannot act except
through its officers, directors, employees, shareholders and other
constituents. Officers, directors, employees and shareholders are the
constituents of the corporate organizational client. The duties defined
in this Comment apply equally to unincorporated associations. "Other
constituents" as used in this Comment means the positions equivalent
to officers, directors, employees and shareholders held by persons
acting for organizational clients that are not corporations.
Id.
Kim, supra note 141, at 181. For a lawyer to properly fulfill his duties, the lawyer must
determine who the client is and who speaks for the client when it is a nonhuman entity,
such as a corporation. Id. at 180. Supreme Court Justice Potter referred to the issue of dual
service as "a vexing problem of professional responsibility." Id. at 183.
162
Id. at 181. See generally John M. Burman, Representing Organizations Part 1I1, 25 WYO.
LAW. 37, 37-41 (2002) (describing the potential conflicts that can arise when interests
diverge and the duties a lawyer is obligated to undertake in such a situation). See also
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 2, 3 (2003).
161
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when an executive of a corporation is involved in fraud, which may
result in serious financial or property injury to the corporation or its
shareholders. 163 At this point the executive can no longer be considered
speaking for the entity. 164

[2] When one of the constituents of an organizational client
communicates with the organization's lawyer in that person's
organizational capacity, the communication is protected by Rule 1.6.
Thus, by the way of example, if an organizational client requests its
lawyer to investigate allegations of wrongdoing, interviews made in
the course of that investigation between the lawyer and the client's
employees or other constituents are covered by Rule 1.6. This does not
mean, however, that constituents of an organizational client are the
clients of the lawyer. The lawyer may not disclose to such constituents
information relating to the representation except for disclosures
explicitly or impliedly authorized by the organizational client in order
to carry out the representation or as otherwise permitted by Rule 1.6.
[3] When constituents of the organization make decisions for it, the
decisions ordinarily must be accepted by the lawyer even if their utility
or prudence is doubtful. Decisions concerning policy and operations,
including ones entailing serious risk, are not such in the lawyer's
province ... [Hlowever, that when the lawyer knows that the
organization is likely to be substantially injured by the action of an
officer or other constituent that violates a legal obligation to the
organization or is in violation of law that might be imputed to the
organization, the lawyer must proceed as is reasonably necessary in
the best interest of the organization.... [KInowledge can be inferred
from circumstances, and a lawyer cannot ignore the obvious.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 2, 3 (2003).
163 See Hugh P. Gunz & Sally P. Gunz, The Lawyer's Response to OrganizationalProfessional

Conflict: An Empirical Study of the Ethical Decision Making of In-House Counsel, 39 AM. BUS.
L.J. 241 (2002); see also Kim, supra note 141 (discussing the ethical dilemmas and analysis
faced by corporate lawyers).
1( Kim, supra note 141, at 181.
The question every corporate lawyer is taught to ask at the outset of a
representation is "Who is my client?" Contrary to popular belief, this
is not so they'll know where to send bills. Rather, it is so they'll know
whose interests they are sworn to protect. When a corporation hires a
lawyer, the lawyer represents the corporation and its shareholders.
Being ever mindful of this answer can help protect lawyers from the
fate visited upon the accounting profession.
While management has the power to hire or fire lawyers who
represent a corporation, lawyers must ask themselves-as well as
management-how what they're being asked to do is intended to
further the company's and shareholders' interests. Corporate lawyers
must be vigilant and protect against conflicts arising between
management and shareholders. Most corporate lawyers recognize and
fulfill that duty -but the profession, as a whole, must hold this duty
paramount.
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In the situation where the lawyer cannot look to the authorized
constituents to speak on behalf of the legal entity, the lawyer is given
guidance, under ABA Model Rule 1.13, to "proceed as is reasonably
necessary in the best interest of the organization." 165 Currently, the ABA
Model Rules authorize the lawyer to take steps to protect the
organizational interests by referring the matter to a higher authority in
the organization. 166 First, the lawyer must determine if the actions of the
constituents will result in substantial injury to the organization and if so,
depending on the seriousness of the violation, the lawyer must refer the
matter to a higher authority within the organization, including the
highest authority determined by law. 167 In addition, ABA Model Rule
1.13 makes no distinction in the obligation owed to the corporation by inhouse and outside counsel. 168 The rule is based on the supposition that
the lawyer's duty is to protect the organization and its shareholders
169
rather than the organization's individual officers and employees.

SEC Address from Pitt, supra note 7.
165 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2003); Kim, supra note 141, at 181, 247-53.
166 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2003); see Burman, supra note 162.
It is axiomatic that an attorney must represent every client zealously.
Loyalty to the client, therefore, is the touchstone of the attorney-client
relationship. That obligation of loyalty is grounded in the law of
agency, which applies to every attorney-client relationship since a
lawyer is always an agent for each of the lawyer's clients. Agents, of
course, owe their principals an unwavering duty of loyalty, including
fiduciary and confidentiality obligations....
Anything which
threatens an attorney's loyalty or a client's confidentiality is, therefore,
a conflict of interest, or at least a potential one. To avoid a grievance, a
malpractice
suit, and/or
being disqualified
from
further
representation, a lawyer has three, inter-related duties regarding
conflicts of interest. The lawyer must: (1) detect any actual or
potential conflict of interest; (2) properly evaluate such conflicts; and
(3) react accordingly.
Burman, supra note 162, at 37.
167 Kim, supra note 141, at 181-82; see also Dietrich, supra note 128, at 937-39 (describing
the role of attorneys involved with Enron and the concealment of fraud within the
organization at all levels).
168 Kim, supra note 141, at 190. In-house lawyers are considered actively involved in
establishing the tone of the corporate environment and serve as legal counsel on
transactions that may have legal ramifications for the corporation. Id. at 201-04.
Additionally, the in-house counsel is conferred with prior to the transaction taking place
and not just after the fact. Id. See generally Gunz & Gunz, supra note 163 (discussing the
studies conducted on organization-professional conflict of in-house counsel between the
requirements of their employer and the ethical requirements of the legal profession).
169 The Preliminary Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate
Responsibility
(july
16,
2002), available at
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/
corporateresponsibility/home.html [hereinafter Preliminary ABA Task Force Report]. The
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The SEC reporting rule has prompted a lot of criticism because of the
conflicts in standards with current ABA Model Rules and state
promulgated and enforced ethics rules. 70 All practicing lawyers are
subject to the ethics rules promulgated and enforced by their respective
state bar, which are most often modeled after the Model Rules adopted
by the American Bar Association. 71 On July 16, 2002, the ABA released
its preliminary report on corporate responsibility ("Preliminary ABA
Task Force Report") prior to the passage of the SOA.172 A focus of the
Preliminary ABA Task Force Report was the existing tone of Rule 1.13.173
The taskforce found that the current rule discourages action by the
lawyer to rectify corporate misconduct by requiring that the lawyer's
actions be "designed to minimize" any possible disruption to the
organization or disclosure of information regarding the representation to
persons outside the organization.' 74 The Preliminary Report found that
the focus was on avoidance of disruption to the organization and not on
the minimization of harm resulting from the misconduct. 175 The
taskforce released its most recent endorsements and adoptions, which
included the revised Rule 1.13, which direct a lawyer, who reasonably
believes that the officer or employee is acting fraudulently, illegally, or in
breach of a duty to the corporation, to take action. 176 The most recent
revisions to ABA Rule 1.13 finds that a lawyer has the duty to report

Report describes possible situations of harm as the result of an officer breaching a duty to
the corporation (i.e., corporate waste or misappropriation of corporate assets) and when the
corporation would be liable against third party claims or fines due to the actions of the
corporation. Id. In August of 2003, the ABA adopted a policy which emphasizes a lawyer's
duty to the organization and not its constituents in the most recent report to the delegates.
The American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, Report to the
(Aug. 11-12, 2003), at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/
House of Delegates
corporateresponsibility/home.html [hereinafter ABA Task Force Endorsements].
170 Mike France, The SEC's Plan Shouldn't Make Lawyers Squak, Bus WK., Jan. 24, 2003, at
44; see infra notes 178-84 and accompanying text.
171 See supra notes 158-69 and accompanying text.
172 Preliminary ABA Task Force Report, supra note 169.
173 Id. at 27.
174 Id. at 28.
175 Id.

176 ABA Task Force Endorsements, supra note 169. The taskforce emphasizes that the
lawyers play a key role in organizational compliance and that to do so, such issues must be
brought to the attention of the appropriate authorities within the organization. Id. To
further this role, the taskforce encourages corporations to adopt procedures that would
allow needed and critical information to reach the proper organizational authorities. Id.
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when a lawyer knows of a violation and her related actions should be
177
prompt and in the interest of protecting the corporation.
In contrast, the adopted up-the-ladder reporting provision of the
SEC requires that the attorney, upon becoming "aware" of any evidence
of a "material violation" to report the violations in a certain pecking
order.17 8 The SEC justifies the scope of the up-the-ladder reporting rule
as one that seeks to deter instances of attorney and issuer misconduct by
requiring internal reporting within the corporation. 179 Additionally, in
instances where misconduct has occurred, the SEC seeks to minimize
damage upon its issuers and shareholders. 80 However, in order for the
SEC to meet these goals, a lawyer must know that she is subject to the
up-the-ladder reporting.' 8' Normally within an organization, there is
one group of attorneys involved in the preparation and submission of
documents that are required under the federal securities compliance
laws. 18 2 Additionally, there is another group of attorneys that is
consulted by an organization regulated by federal securities laws in
traditionally non-securities compliance matters. 8 3 An expansive view of
attorneys, under the SEC rule, creates uncertainty for all lawyers
involved in the corporate arena as to the jurisdiction of the SEC up-theladder reporting rule. s4

177 ABA Task Force Report Adopting Rule 1.13 (Aug. 11-12, 2003) [hereinafter ABA
Taskforce
Report
Adopting
Rule 1.131,
at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/
corporateresponsibility/home.html. "[T]he starting point of the recommended rule is
subjective: the obligation to take action would arise only on the basis of facts known to the
lawyer." Id. The trigger would then be looked at under the objective test, "whether a
reasonable lawyer who knows such facts would, in similar circumstances, conclude that the
conduct.. . is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization." Id.
178 Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 17 C.F.R.
§ 205.3(b) (2003).
179 See SEC Proposed Up-the-Ladder Rule, supra note 102; see also Sen. Edwards Miffed by
SEC Accounting Ruling, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., Jan. 26, 2003, at B3; Michael Schroeder,
SEC Modifies New Attorney Rules, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2003, at Cll.
180 See SEC Proposed Up-the-Ladder Rule, supra note 102. The SEC also states that the
rule is not intended to "impair zealous advocacy" or "discourage issuers from seeking and
obtaining effective and creative legal advice." Id.
181 See letter from Alfred P. Carlton, Jr. President, ABA, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary,
SEC (Apr. 2, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/S74502/aba040203.
htm.
182 See SEC Proposed Up-the-Ladder Rule, supra note 102.
183 See letter from Alfred P. Carlton to Jonathan G. Katz, supra note 181.
184 Id.; Jenny B. Davis, Sorting Out Sarbanes-Oxley, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2003, at 44.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol38/iss4/3

Ahuja: What Do I Do Now? A Lawyer's Duty Post-Sarbanes-Oxley

2004]
a.

A Lawyer's Duty

1305

To Whom Does the Duty Apply?

In addition to the state promulgated ethics rule, the SEC rule triggers
an additional affirmative duty to report upon discovering fraud or
misconduct for which an attorney may face SEC disciplinary
proceedings if in violation. 185 However, lawyers will not be in a position
186
to comply without clearer guidance as to who is subject to this duty.
The SEC attempted to narrow and better define the scope of attorneys
and to whom the duty would apply in the adopted version of the
reporting rule. 18 7 The adopted rule still retains an expansive view of

185 See letter from Alfred P. Carlton to Jonathan G. Katz, supra note 181. The ABA takes a
position that generally an expansive scope may be acceptable when determining whose
conduct may be sanctionable; however, when requiring an SEC mandated affirmative
action, it is inappropriate. Id.; see also Mary Jo White, Bruce E. Yannett, & Jonathon R.
Tuttle, Lawyers' Roles After Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley: Advocate, Counselors and ...
Gatekeepers Too?, in CORP. LAW 2002, at 1295, 1308-10 (PLI Corp. Law and Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 1343, 2002). Congress did not specifically address what a lawyer
must do if there is no response within a corporation. Id. The SEC has a varied history in
bringing, enforcement proceeding against attorneys. Id. at 1308-10, 1314. In the past, the
SEC has been limited to enforcement actions that involve securities law violations and not
that of professional standards. Id.
186 See generally letter from Alfred P. Carlton to Jonathan G. Katz, supra note 181.; letter
from Charles E.H. Luedde, Former SEC Chairman, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC
(Dec. 2, 2002), availableat http:/www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/S74502/cehlueddel.htm.
[Als a matter of practicality, I question whether the Commission's
attempt to utilize a broad definition-and thereby at least potentially
have the capacity to bar a larger portion of the practicing bar from
"practice before the Commission"-is reasonably suited to the
disciplinary power sought. Given the relative anonymity (vis a vis the
Commission) of many attorneys who participate in the disclosure
process-and given the fact that much of that role can in fact be
performed without status as an attorney-unless there is active
corresponding discipline from state bar organizations, Commission
sanctions may be illusory.
Letter from Charles E.H. Luedde to Jonathan G. Katz, supra.
187 Compare SEC Proposed Up-the-Ladder Rule, supra note 102, § 205.2(a), with
Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(a)
(2003). The proposed rule provided:
(a) Appearing and practicing before the Commission includes, but is
not limited to, an attorney's:
(1) Transacting any business with the Commission, including
communication with Commissioners, the Commission, or its staff;
(2) Representing any party to, or the subject of, or a witness in a
Commission administrative proceeding;
(3) Representing any person in connection with any Commission
investigation, inquiry, information request, or subpoena;
(4) Preparing, or participating in the process of preparing, any
statement, opinion, or other writing which the attorney has reason to
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attorneys and could potentially include those attorneys that prepare and
review documents in the ordinary course of business, which are
unrelated to the securities filings or practice, but ultimately are used for
some related purpose regarding compliance with the SEC. 188

believe will be filed with or incorporated into any registration
statement, notification, application, report, communication or other
document filed with or submitted to the Commissioners, the
Commission, or its staff; or
(5) Advising any party that:
(i) A statement, opinion, or other writing need not or should not be
filed with or incorporated into any registration statement, notification,
application, report, communication or other document filed with or
submitted to the Commissioners, the Conunission, or its staff; or
(ii) The party is not obligated to submit or file a registration statement,
notification, application, report, communication or other document
with the Commission or its staff.
SEC Proposed Up-the-Ladder Rule, supra note 102, § 205.2(a). The adopted rule provides:
(a) Appearing and practicing before the Commission:
(1) Means:
(i) Transacting any business with the Commission, including
communications in any form;
(ii) Representing an issuer in a Commission administrative proceeding
or in connection with any Commission investigation, inquiry,
information request, or subpoena;
(iii) Providing advice in respect of the United States securities laws or
the Commission's rules or regulations thereunder regarding any
document that the attorney has notice will be filed with or submitted
to, or incorporated into any document that will be filed with or
submitted to, the Commission, including the provision of such advice
in the context of preparing, or participating in the preparation of, any
such document; or
(iv) Advising an issuer as to whether information or a statement,
opinion, or other writing is required under the United States securities
laws or the Commission's rules or regulations thereunder to be filed
with or submitted to, or incorporated into any document that will be
filed with or submitted to, the Commission; but
(2) Does not include an attorney who:
(i) Conducts the activities in paragraphs (a)(1)(i) through (a)(1)(iv) of
this section other than in the context of providing legal services to an
issuer with whom the attorney has an attorney-client relationship; or
(ii) Is a non-appearing foreign attorney.
Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(a)
(2003).
188 See letter from Alfred P. Carlton to Jonathan G. Katz, supra note 181.
The following are examples of areas of potential uncertainty:
Lawyer A, who has a limited non-securities specialty, prepares a draft
of a section for inclusion in a prospectus (e.g., description of a patent,
regulatory requirements or litigation).
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Additionally, this rule may also include those attorneys that simply
advise that the corporation does not have to file a specific report based
189
on an available exemption under the existing securities laws.
One consequence of an expansive definition of to be "appearing and
practicing before the Commission" is that attorneys will hesitate or will
be deterred from reviewing documents or filings for fear of being subject
to the rule's disciplinary proceedings. 190 The scope of the proposed rule
encompassed an attorney who was not regularly in the business of
securities compliance, for example, a patent attorney, solely because of
the manner in which her documents are used. This patent attorney
would fall within the broad scope of the rule even if the documents were
not originally intended for securities compliance. 191 This patent attorney
is in a better position to serve the public interest by being cognizant of
her duty throughout the entire engagement. The duty should be
determined on the primary purpose and specialty of her work product
rather than a possible use.192 An attorney conscious of which entity
determines her duty, the SEC or the state bar, is able to appropriately
report fraud to the client and in so abiding is able to avoid disciplinary
193
proceedings by either entity.
In its commentary to the adopted rule, the SEC stated that the
proposed rule's scope was narrowed by adding that an attorney must
have "notice" from the corporation that the document will be used in

Lawyer A instead reviews a draft of the section prepared by a
securities lawyer.
Lawyer B, a litagator, prepares a summary of pending litigation for
general use, knowing it may be used as a diligence checklist for future
securities offerings.
Lawyer B responds to a routine auditor's request for information on
pending litigation in connection with the auditor giving its consent for
a registration statement.
Lawyer C, a real estate specialist, drafts a complex lease that will be
filed as an exhibit to the company's Form 10-K.
Id.
189 Id. The commentary from the adopted rule provides that "[alttorneys who advise
that, under the federal securities laws, a particular document need not be incorporated into
a filing, registration statement or other submission to the Commission will be covered by
Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for
the revised definition."
Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. 6298 (Feb. 6, 2003).
190
See SEC Connent Letters, supranote 148 (letter from seventy-seven law firms).
191
See letter from Alfred P. Carlton to Jonathan G. Katz, supra note 181.
192 See id.
193 See id.
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compliance matters.1 94 However, it appears the "notice" requirement
does not narrow the scope but instead provides loopholes in
enforcement. 95 First, a non-securities attorney must rely on the
corporation for "notice" because the documents being prepared may
normally be used for daily business purposes and may be used
secondarily in compliance matters. Second, the "notice" requirement can
serve as an out for an attorney that claims she did not receive proper or
timely notice because the rule's commentary does not make clear when
and how "notice" is to be given. 96 Additionally, the adopted rule still
retains the proposed rule's scope problem because the lawyer's duty can
97
be different based on the use of the document.
For example, a patent attorney can prepare Document A for an
organization where she was put on "notice" that it will be used in a
compliance matter and then the next day, the same attorney can prepare
Document B for an organization that will not be used in a compliance
manner. In this situation, the use of the document rather than the
primary purpose of her work is still determining the lawyer's duty. 98
It appears that the duty of the lawyer can vary based on the use of
the document by the client. SEC enforcement of this rule will prove to be

Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. 6298
(Feb. 6,2003) (emphasis added).
195
Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 17 C.F.R.
§ 205.2(a)(iii) (2003).
(iii) Providing advice in respect of the United States securities laws or
the Commission's rules or regulations thereunder regarding any
document that the attorney has notice will be filed with or submitted
to, ... the Commission, including the provision of such advice in the
context of preparing, or participating in the preparation of, any such
document.
Id.
194

196

Id.
[Ain attorney must have notice that a document he or she is preparing
or assisting in preparing will be submitted to the Commission to be
deemed to be "appearing and practicing" under the revised definition.
The definition in the final rule thereby also clarifies that an attorney's
preparation of a document ... which he or she never intended or had
notice would be submitted to the Commission, or incorporated into a
document submitted to the Commission, but which subsequently is
submitted to the Commission as an exhibit to or in connection with a
filing, does not constitute "appearing and practicing" before the
Commission.

Id.
197
198

See supra text accompanying notes 190-93.
See supra text accompanying notes 190-93.
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a problem if a lawyer is not held to a single standard at all times.
Further, because of the ambiguity in the rule, the SEC would have to
show that the corporation gave proper notice to the attorney and that it
was timely enough to have put the lawyer in a position to have detected
and reported the fraud.
Therefore, the investing public would be better served by imposing
the affirmative duty on those attorneys substantially involved in
compliance matters and/or practicing securities attorneys. 199 Further, a
securities lawyer must be free to give advice to the client without fear of
legal liability. 2°° However, a securities lawyer must draw a line between
advising clients in difficult business judgements and in actions involving
fraud. 2 1 This line may be a difficult one for the SEC and the lawyer to
judge, but the public would be better served with an attorney assisting
and counseling the client towards compliance instead of immediately
20 2
engaging in up-the-ladder reporting solely to relieve her liability.
An attorney who falls outside the jurisdiction of the SEC rule, in a
narrow interpretation, would be subject to the current ABA Model Rule
1.13 to "proceed as reasonably necessary" to protect her client. 203 An

199 See letter from seventy-seven law firms to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (Dec. 18,
2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/S74502/77lawfirms1.htm.
200 In re Carter & Johnson, supra note 53, at 320.
Significant public benefits flow from effective performance of the
securities lawyer's role. The exercise of independent, careful and
informed legal judgement on difficult issues is critical to the flow of
material information to the securities markets. Moreover, we are
aware of the difficulties and limitations attendant upon that role. In
the course of rendering securities law advice, the lawyer is called upon
to make difficult judgements, often under great pressure and in areas
where the legal signposts are far apart and only faintly discernible.
If a securities lawyer is to bring his best independent judgement
to bear on a disclosure problem, he must have the freedom to make
innocent - or even, in certain cases, careless - mistakes without fear of
legal liability or loss of the ability to practice before the Commission.
Concern about his own liability may alter the balance of his judgement
in one direction as surely as an unseemly obeisance to the wishes of his
client can do so in the other. While one imbalance results in disclosure
rather than concealment, neither is, in the end, truly in the public
interest. Lawyers who are seen by their clients as being motivated by
fears for their personal liability will not be consulted on difficult issues.
Id.
201 Id.
202 See generally In re Carter & Johnson, supra note 53.
203 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2003); see supra notes 141-44 and
accompanying text.
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attorney, subject to ABA Rule 1.13, is also required to consider reporting
up-the-ladder internally in order to best serve the interests of the
The ABA Taskforce Report Adopting Rule 1.13,
organization. 2°4
emphasizes that the ABA Model Rule should actively encourage
attorneys to take action rather than discourage reporting to higher
authorities within an organization. 205 Therefore, with a narrow SEC
interpretation, each attorney involved in the corporate arena would be
aware of her duty and able to comply to best serve the needs of the
investing public while avoiding personal disciplinary proceedings.
b.

Ambiguity in Triggering Standard

A second possible consequence of an expansive scope is that an
objective standard would hold a non-securities lawyer to the level of a
securities lawyer in determining what would constitute the triggering of
an up-the-ladder report.20 6 In its commentary, the SEC interprets that the
attorney's reporting obligation is triggered when (1) an attorney has
credible evidence of a material violation, (2) where it would be
unreasonable, under the circumstances for a prudent competent attorney
not to conclude, (3) that a material violation has occurred, is occurring, or
is about to occur. 207 The obligation to report would be triggered by any
204 See supra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
205 ABA Taskforce Report Adopting Rule 1.13, supra note 177.

The committee
emphasizes in their report that this rule provides guidance "in the extraordinary
circumstance of a significant failure of governance that puts or threatens to cause
substantial injury." Id.
206 See supra notes 141-46 and accompanying text.
207 Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 17 C.F.R. § 205.2
(e), (i), (l)-(m) (2003).
(e) Evidence of a material violation means credible evidence, based upon
which it would be unreasonable, under the circumstances, for a
prudent and competent attorney not to conclude that it is reasonably
likely that a material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to
occur.

(i) Material violation means a material violation of an applicable United
States federal or state securities law, a material breach of fiduciary
duty arising under United States federal or state law, or a similar
material violation of any United States federal or state law.
(1) Reasonable or reasonably denotes, with respect to the actions of an
attorney, conduct that would not be unreasonable for a prudent and
competent attorney.
(m) Reasonably believes means that an attorney believes the matter in
question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is not
unreasonable.
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attorney considered to be "appearing and practicing before the
commission." 208 In drafting this rule, the SEC commented that the
reporting rule covers all written and oral communication with the SEC
and related filings. 20 9 The proposed SEC rule required reporting when
there was "evidence of a material violation." The triggering standard
was narrowed in the adopted version but it is still problematic because
the rule requires the lawyer to take action when "it would be
unreasonable, for a prudent and competent lawyer not to conclude that it
210
is reasonably likely" that a fraud may be taking place.
An attorney would then be in a position to not only second-guess
whether the rule would apply to her but also what is considered not to be
acting reasonably. 211 The SEC commentary in the adopted rule precludes
the beliefs of the lawyer and instead focuses on what information would
be considered unreasonable not to report.212 With this standard, an

Id. The commentary found in the adopted rule provides:
[The] revised definition of "evidence of a material violation" clarifies
aspects of the objective standard that the Commission sought to
achieve in the definition originally proposed .... Some commentors,
including some practicing attorneys, found the proposed reporting
triggers too high. Many legal scholars endorsed the framework of
increasingly higher triggers for reporting proposed by the Commission
at successive stages in the reporting process but considered the
Commission's attempt at articulating an objective standard
unworkable and suggested changes to the language in the proposed
rule.
Nearly all practicing lawyers who commented found the
reporting trigger in the rule too low and called instead for a subjective
standard, requiring "actual belief" that a material violation has
occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur before the attorney would be
obligated to make an initial report within the client issuer. The revised
definition incorporates suggested changes into an objective standard
that is designed to facilitate the effective operation of the rule and to
encourage the reporting of evidence of material violations.
Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. 6301-02
(Feb. 6, 2003).
208 Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 17 C.F.R. § 205.3
(a) (2003).
209 SEC Proposed Up-the-Ladder Rule, supra note 102.
210 See letter from Alfred P. Carlton to Jonathan G. Katz, supra note 181; letter from
Edward H. Fleischman and twenty-nine individuals to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC
(Nov. 25, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/S74502/ehfleischman1.
htm.
211
212

Id.

Compare Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed.
Reg. 6302 (Feb. 6, 2003), with SEC Proposed Up-the-Ladder Rule, supra note 148. The
comments to the adopted rule provide:
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attorney would have to report any information that may be a material
violation so as to avoid liability because of the possibility of a broad
interpretation of "unreasonable." 213 The adopted rule's commentary
recognizes that there is an acceptable range of conduct that would be
214
unreasonable by considering the circumstances of the lawyer.

Under the Commission's rule, evidence of a material violation must be
reported in all circumstances in which it would be unreasonable for a
prudent and competent attorney not to conclude that it is "reasonably
likely" that a material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to
occur. To be "reasonably likely" a material violation must be more
than a mere possibility, but it need not be "more likely than not." If a
material violation is reasonably likely, attorney must report evidence
of this violation. The term "reasonably likely" qualifies each of the
three instances when a report must be made. Thus, a report is
required when it is reasonably likely a violation has occurred, when it
is reasonably likely a violation is ongoing or when reasonably likely a
violation is about to occur.
Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. 6302
(Feb. 6, 2003). The proposed rules provided:
The objective standard is intended to preclude reports based on mere
suspicion of a material violation while providing reasonable flexibility
to attorneys when evaluating their reporting obligations under the
proposed rule. An individual attorney is not excused from reporting
evidence of a material violation on the grounds that he or she does not
personally believe that a material violation has occurred, is occurring,
or is about to occur. Under the definition of "reasonably believes" ...
any information that would lead an attorney, acting reasonably, to
believe that a material violation has occurred, is occurring, or is about
to occur must be reported -whether or not the reporting attorney
subjectively believes it. An individual attorney is not, however,
required to report within the issuer evidence of a material violation
that the attorney thinks is insufficient to lead an attorney, acting
reasonably, to believe that a material violation has occurred, is
occurring, or is about to occur. The definition does not prescribe a
process by which an attorney must evaluate evidence he or she learns
about.
SEC Proposed Up-the-Ladder Rule, supra note 148.
213 See letter from Alfred P. Carlton to Jonathan G. Katz, supra note 181.
We believe the Commission's attempt to create an objective standard is
flawed in several respects.... Assuming that the lawyer is, in fact,
aware of evidence of a possible violation and is not obligated to
investigate, the issue then becomes the nature of the required
assessment of the information that the lawyer has actually acquired.
That assessment should be evaluated in the context of what the lawyer
has actually come to know and believes, not what some hypothetical
objectively reasonable lawyer might conclude.
Letter from seventy-seven law firms to Jonathan G. Katz, supra note 199.
214 Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. 6302
(Feb. 6, 2003).
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However, as in the proposed rule, a non-securities lawyer would not be
in a position necessarily to be aware of any fraud, and therefore, it would
215
difficult for the attorney to act in compliance with the adopted rule.
The "circumstances" that would be considered would leave a great
amount of wiggle room for when an attorney has to engage in up-theladder reporting.216 A securities compliance attorney could argue that in
light of the surrounding circumstances, a reasonable attorney would
have either not detected the fraud or, if so, thought it best not to engage
in up-the-ladder reporting. 217 Additionally, a patent lawyer could argue
that a prudent patent lawyer would not have detected the securities
violation. 218 However, if the rule was narrowed further to apply to
securities compliance attorneys only, then a single reasonableness
standard could be used by an attorney and the SEC. The interest of the
investing public is best served when all attorneys are subject to rules that
are clearly defined. Clearly defined rules will allow an attorney to
promote legal compliance within an organization and fulfil her duties as
promulgated by both the SEC and the state bar.
2.

SEC's Broad Scope Is Outside of Legislative Intent

In adopting an expansive view of required disclosure, the SEC
reporting rule falls beyond the scope of the legislative intent of the SOA's

[The Rule's] formulation, while intended to adopt an objective
standard, also recognizes that there is a range of conduct in which an
attorney
may engage without being unreasonable.
The
"circumstances" are the circumstances at the time the attorney decides
whether he or she is obligated to report the information. These
circumstances may include, among others, the attorney's professional
skills, background and experience, the time constraints under which
the attorney is acting, the attorney's previous experience and
familiarity with the client, and the availability of other lawyers with
whom the lawyer may consult. Under the revised definition, an
attorney is not required (or expected) to report "gossip, hearsay, or
innuendo." Nor is the rule's reporting obligation triggered by "a
combination of circumstances from which the attorney, in retrospect,
should have drawn an inference," as one commentator feared.
Id.
215 See letter from Alfred P. Carlton to Jonathan G. Katz, supra note 181.
216 See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 17 C.F.R.
§ 205.2 (e) (2003). The commentary suggests that an attorney may engage in an undefined
range of conduct, which may be considered reasonable. Implementation of Standards of
Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. 6301-02 (Feb. 6, 2003).
217
Id.
218

Id.
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section 307, which mandates the promulgation of up-the-ladder
reporting. 219 The overarching legislative intent of the SOA was to
increase corporate responsibility, transparency and disclosure of
reporting statements, as well as to increase resources and oversight for
the SEC. 220 Section 307 of the SOA furthered the overall goal of
corporate accountability by emphasizing that a lawyer owed her duty to
the organization and the shareholders as the clients, and not the officers
and directors of the organization. 221 Additionally, section 307 was
enacted to ensure that when a lawyer sees that an illegal or fraudulent
act is about to occur or is occurring, the lawyer will act in the interest of
222
the shareholders.

219 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat. 745 (2002); Karmel,
supra note 119, at 3.
220 148 CONG. REC. S6524 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement read by legislative clerk).
"[This is] a bill to improve quality and transparency in financial reporting and independent
audits and accounting services for public companies... to increase corporate responsibility
and the usefulness of corporate financial disclosure ... to improve Securities and
Id. The Senate wanted to help
Exchange Commission resources and oversight .
frustrated investors:
As we have seen over the past few months, the continued lapses of our
corporate leaders, whether they are ethical, criminal or just plain
ignorant, have a significant, sometimes crippling, effect on the welfare
of our nation. We must make some fundamental changes in the
current system of corporate oversight to protect Americans from
avarice, greed, ignorance and criminal behavior. Now is the time for
Congress to restore investor confidence and take the necessary action
to protect the interests of the public shareholders and place those
interests above the personal interests of those entrusted with managing
and advising those companies. The deterioration of the checks and
balances that safeguard the public against corporate abuses must be
reversed.
Id. at S6528 (statement of Sen. McCain).
221 Id. at S6551 (statement of Sen. Edwards).
One of the problems we have seen occurring with this sort of crisis in
corporate misconduct is that some lawyers have forgotten their
responsibility.... If you are a lawyer for a corporation, your client is
the corporation and you work for the corporation and you work for
the shareholders, the investors in that corporation; that is to whom you
owe your responsibility and loyalty. And you have a responsibility to
zealously advocate for the shareholders and investors in that
corporation.
Id.
222 Id. at S6552 (statement of Sen. Edwards).
One of the most critical responsibilities that those lawyers have is,
when they see something occurring or about to occur that violates that
law, breaks the law, they must act as an advocate for the shareholders,
for the company itself, for the investors. They are there and they can
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The debate on the Senate floor focused on the responsibility of
lawyers to assist management of corporations in complying with
securities laws to better protect the investing public. 22 Congress, in
focusing its debate on securities compliance, limited the authority of the
agency to promulgate a rule with jurisdiction confined to the furtherance
of securities compliance as required by the Securities Acts.224 The SEC,
in adopting such an expansive view, exceeded this express limited
authority granted by Congress. In addition, the overall purpose of the
SEC is to provide full and fair disclosure to investors, 225 and any
rulemaking must be limited to furthering the agency's goals. 226 In
adopting expansive jurisdiction, the SEC rule seeks to regulate all
corporate lawyers involved in a public organization, and not solely the
ones that further its interest of compliance with federal securities laws,

see what is happening. They know the law and their responsibility is
to do something about it if they see the law being broken or about to
be broken.
This amendment is about making sure that those lawyers, in addition
to the accountants and executives in the company, don't violate the
law and, in fact, more importantly, ensure that the law is being
followed.
Id.
Id. at S6554-55 (statement of Sen. Enzi).
I2
[Ilt has become clear that the role of attorneys who counseled these
corporations and their accountants must be scrutinized as well. Just
like accountants, these lawyers are expected to represent the
corporation in the best interests of the shareholders. In doing so, these
attorneys are hired to aid the corporation and its accountants in
adhering to Federal securities law.
When their counsel and advice is sought, attorneys should have
an explicit, not just an implied, duty to advise the primary officer and
then, if necessary, the auditing committee or the board of directors of
any serious legal violation of the law by a corporate agent. Currently,
there is no explicit mandate requiring this standard of conduct. It is
clearly in the best interest of their client to disclose this kind of
information to the board, rather than just upper management ....
This amendment is simple. It requires the attorney to contact specific
persons who are part of the management hierarchy and explain the
problem. If that fails to correct the problem, the attorney must contact
the audit committee or the board of directors.
Id.
See Karmel, supra note 119, at 3; Strauss, supra note 88, at 5.
225 See supratext accompanying notes 34-54 (discussing the intent of Congress in enacting
federal securities laws).
226
See supra notes 51-63 and accompanying text (discussing the authority granted to the
SEC in the securities laws).
224
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thereby exceeding its jurisdiction and infringing on the state bar's
227
jurisdiction.
Currently, ABA Model Rule 1.13 allows attorneys more discretion in
balancing their obligation to engage in "friendly disclosures" based on
the seriousness of the violation, whereas the SEC rule mandates
228
affirmative up-the-ladder reporting without attorney discretion.
Therefore, the required affirmative reporting duty and the resulting
overbreadth of attorneys subject to enforcement proceedings by the SEC
will defeat the purpose of effectuating the up-the-ladder reporting
requirement that was intended to serve the public interest of preventing
fraud. 229 In addition, the legislative history shows the intent was to
encourage those who counsel in SEC compliance matters to comply with
full and fair disclosure. 230 However, by adopting a broad view of
attorneys that fall within the requirement of the SEC rule, public interest
will not be served when lawyers who are non-securities specialists are
subject to SEC enforcement. 231 By limiting the scope of attorneys subject

227 See supra notes 186-202 and accompanying text.
n8 See Karmel, supra note 119, at 3; Strauss, supra note 88, at 5. The recent revision of
Model Code Rule 1.13 still allows the attorney to determine the likeliness of the substantial
injury that may result from the constituent's actions before reporting to a higher authority.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2003).

229 Arthur D. Burger, How Increased SEC Oversight of the Bar Could Change the Client
Relationship, LEGAL TIMEs, Aug. 12, 2002, at 1. The increased obligations under the Act are
likely to create a "worry factor" that will lead to attorneys to err on the side of over
reporting. Id.; see letter from Alfred P. Carlton to Jonathan G. Katz, supra note 181.
130 See letter from Alfred P. Carlton to Jonathan G. Katz, supra note 181. "The breadth of
coverage of the proposals will have a counterproductive impact of discouraging broad
participation in assuring quality disclosure and providing expert transactional planning."
Id.
231

Id.

Notwithstanding the proposed rule's elaborate "up-the-line"
procedures, I believe that it does little to address the core issue of
whether there has been adequate disclosure of all material facts
required to be disclosed or necessary to make the disclosures made not
misleading. By focusing on a remote and improbable scenario it
constructs an [sic] hypothetical straw man. By ignoring the real world
the proposed rule risks becoming just so much window dressing
without any real benefit to existing or prospective investors or to the
restoration of confidence in the marketplace. This does not mean that
the proposed rule is toothless and therein lies its danger. The zealous
and overreaching nature of certain portions of the proposed rule
results in the inclusion of provisions which threaten-by tacitly
placing attorneys in the unwarranted role of expertizing the entire
content of clients disclosure documents - to make attorneys guarantors
of those disclosures.
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to up-the-ladder reporting to those whose overall responsibilities are to
advise on SEC and registration compliance, the affirmative duty is
limited to those who are in the best position to know the rules and
comply with them. 232 In addition, public interest will still be served by
limiting the scope of the SEC rule because all other non-securities
attorneys would fall under the ABA Model Rule 1.13 requirement and
233
similar state ethics rules.
B.

Withdraw and Snitch to the SEC- The "Noisy Withdrawal" Proposal
The SEC is taking a statutory assignment that requires a
scalpel and going after it with a meat cleaver.?3

"Noisy withdrawal," as proposed by the SEC, does not protect the
public from corporate fraud but instead alters the attorney-client
relationship and may lead to less candid communications between the
attorney and the client. 235 The proposed SEC rule, which mandates
withdrawal and notice to the SEC, is problematic because it alters the
confidence that corporations place in their corporate counsel. 23 6 With
increased market demands, the role of the corporate counsel has
expanded from just incident-related activities to more of an influence
over the shape of major corporate transactions while identifying and

Letter from Charles E.H. Leudde to Jonathan G. Katz, supra note 186.
232 Letter from Alfred P. Carlton to Jonathan G. Katz, supra note 181. Additionally, the
ABA recommends that SEC enforcement of this reporting requirement be limited to U.S.
law. Id. The ABA also discusses how a broad view of attorneys that are considered to be
practicing before the Commission could lead to confusion as to what triggers the
"reasonably know or should know" obligation. Id. If the rule is limited to the conduct of
those attorneys that have significant responsibility in securities compliance within an
organization then an objective standard would be easier to apply. Id. However, with a
broad view, non-security lawyers could not be held to the standard of securities lawyers
and the objective standard would be much more difficult to apply. Id.
233 Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 141-43 (discussing ABA Model Rule 1.13).
2
Tamara Loomis, 75 Law Firms Weigh in with Letter to SEC on Disclosures, 228 N.Y. L.J. 1
(Dec. 18, 2002) (quoting Edward Fleischman, former SEC Chairman); see also letter from
Edward Fleischman to Jonathan G. Katz, supra note 210.
235 See infra text accompanying notes 248-66. In 1978, the SEC argued that the attorney
had a duty to "blow the whistle." SEC v. Nat'l Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 701
(D.C. Cir. 1978). The court found that the attorneys should have disclosed the information
and should have not "lent the appearance of legitimacy" of the transaction. Id. at 713.
However the court did not find that the attorney had a duty to tell third parties of the
fraud, but they did have a duty to take steps within the corporation to try and rectify the
fraud. Id.
236 See letter from Alfred P. Carlton to Jonathan G. Katz, supra note 181.
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237
reducing key legal liabilities of on-going corporate activities.
Additionally, corporate counsel is expected to be proficient in
recommending different organizational management techniques to help
minimize legal liabilities. 238 Corporate counsel is also often consulted by
corporate mangers for advice on ways to implement processes that will
minimize risks of fraud, illegal conduct, and corporate liability. 239 The
opportunity for fraud and illegal conduct is minimized by encouraging
internal corporate compliance, addressing problems as they are detected
or reported, and considering new approaches to different business
240
decisions as societal and economic demands change.

Lawyers possess special skills and qualifications, including their
In retaining diverse job
inquisitive and probative nature. 241
responsibilities within an organization, they are able to compile many
aspects of the corporate decision-making process and to incorporate and
Shareholders must rely on the
encourage legal compliance. 242

237 McMillen v. McCahan, 167 N.E.2d 541,550 (Ohio 1960).
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to
actions and special proceedings and the management of such actions
and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all
kinds, and in general all advice to clients and all action taken for them
in matters connected with the law.
Id. (quoting Cuyahoga Abstract Title & Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23 (1934)); see
also WILLIAM J. CARNEY, THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE CORPORATE ATTORNEY 34-46 (1982)

(discussing the fluctuation in attorneys employed by corporations to help protect against
legal liabilities); Richard S. Gruner, The Role of the General Counsel: Perspective: General
Counsel in an Era of Compliance Programs, 46 EMORY L.J. 1113 (1997) (discussing how
attorneys play key roles in various types of organizations).
23
Gruner, supra note 237, at 1114. The increased functions of corporate counsel, as a
result of the growing risks at stake, include helping to shape corporate compliance systems.
Id.
239 Id. at 1152. Corporate compliance includes internal procedures to test operational
procedures, compilation and analysis of collected data to improve internal systems, and
incentives or disincentives for employees to encourage lawful corporate activities. Id. at
1153-63. Additionally, corporations are encouraged to maintain some form of whistleblower reporting system and protection that encourages self-reporting at the earliest
possible moment. Id. at 1160.
240 See infra text accompanying notes 241-45; see also Joseph E. Murphy, Can the Scandals
Teach Us Anything?, 12 BuS. L. TODAY 11 (2003) (discussing the surge in recent corporate
self-governance in the past decade due to the enactment of Organizational Sentencing
Guidelines).
CARNEY, supra note 237, at 3; see Gruner, supranote 237, at 1141-64.
241
242 Kim, supra note 141, at 202-03. With this unique role, comes the possibility for
conflicts of interests. Id. at 204-18. For example, when a lawyer serves as a legal advisor to
the Board and is also a director of the same corporation, the director, in making business
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information provided to them from the corporation. 243 Corporate
counsel's duty is to ensure that management is being provided with
accurate assessments of legal liabilities and requirements. 244 Corporate
counsel can only properly fulfill this duty if actively involved in the
strategic business planning, daily management activities, and other daily
245
and long-term corporate decision-making processes.
Further, corporate counsel is not considered to be independent from
the client, but instead owes a duty and obligation to zealously advocate
for the client. 246 When corporate counsel is required to provide notice to
the SEC of violations, the corporation's constituents may consider the
possibility of consulting counsel on difficult or close issues too large of a
risk.247 If the lawyer had an opportunity to spend time and consult with
management instead of immediately reporting the possible violation,
then the corporation would less likely become involved in costly

decisions, is relying on the very same advice that the director as a lawyer has given. id. at
183-84. This conflict is not in violation of current ethics rules. Id.; see also CHARLES R.
HANN, How CORPORATIONS AND THEIR LEGAL DEPARTMENTS FUNCTION (1992) (listing and
describing the various areas lawyers play a role within organizations and their respective
responsibilities); Ronald C. Minkoff, A Leak in the Dike: Expanding the Doctrine of Waiver of
the Attorney-Client Privilege, in N.Y. LAW 2002, at 195 (PLI N.Y. Law Practice Course,
Handbook Series No. 126, 2002) (discussing the roles that lawyers play in encouraging legal
compliance through interaction with many departments within a corporation); John H.
McGuckin, Vice Chairman of American Corporate Counsel Association, Written Testimony
at the ABA Taskforce on Corporate Responsibility
(Nov. 11, 2002), at
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/home.html
(testifying to the
importance of lawyers within a corporation; over 55% executives that were surveyed by the
Association found that the legal department was in the top five most critical departments
of their corporation).
243 Gruner, supra note 237, at 1120.
244 CARNEY, supra note 237, at 37-41; Gruner, supra note 237, at 1145. With the growing
securities regulations and required public disclosures, lawyers need to be able to access
information from various areas within a corporation. CARNEY, supra note 237, at 39.
245 Kim, supra note 141, at 202.
246 3D HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SEC. & FED. CORP. LAW § 20.69 (2002).
An accountant purports to be independent whereas an attorney has a duty to represent his
or her client's interest with zeal while also protecting the client's confidential
communications. Id.
247 See letter from Alfred P. Carlton to Jonathan G. Katz, supra note 181; Subin, supra note
153, at 1096-97. The lawyer's duty is to the client and the client can best be served if the
lawyer is able to protect confidences when guiding individuals, clients through the legal
maze. Subin, supra note 153, at 1096-97. In situations where the attorney is an intricate part
of the fraud, ethics rules will do little to guide him or her, however, in situations where the
lawyer learns of fraud in which he or she plays no part, the lawyers guidance can be key to
protecting the shareholders' interests. Id. at 1112.
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investigatory proceedings before the SEC, which may ultimately damage
the shareholder.
Corporate counsel must have access to the facts from the
client/organization in order to protect the investing public by
encouraging legal compliance and disclosure by the corporation.248 If a
client fears public disclosure of facts and subsequent prosecution
because of consulting or disclosing information to the attorney, then the
client may be dissuaded from coming forth to either prevent or rectify a
harmful situation for the shareholders. 249 The lack of candor from the
client or its constituents could ultimately harm the public instead of
protecting it. A consequence of the required disclosure mandate will
lead to corporations not consulting attorneys when considering issues
that may require management to make close business judgements and
thereby reduce the information that an attorney has access to.
A second prevailing consequence of the "noisy withdrawal" rule is
that the communications between the corporate counsel and client are
fundamentally changed because a lawyer may be forced to disclose
confidential communications to the SEC. 250 The varying disclosure
requirement theories are often based on the assumptions about how
lawyers and clients will behave when communications between them are

See letter from seventy-seven law firms to Jonathan G Katz, supra note 199.
Confidentiality and related attorney-client privileges have been
misused by some clients and abused by some lawyers who are
complicit in their client's wrongdoings. But such abuse takes place in
an extraordinarily small number of cases, and we should not make
rules and set norms for the standards of the bar on a miniscule
deviation from what otherwise is effective counseling.
SEC Letter from Barry Nagler et al., American Corporate Counsel Association, to Jonathan
at
available
2002),
18,
(Dec.
SEC
Secretary,
Katz,
G.
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/S74502/bnagler1.htm.
249
Letter from seventy-seven law firms to Jonathan G. Katz, supra note 199.
The public is best protected by a lawyer-client relationship in which
clients are encouraged to discuss their activities openly with their
lawyers in order to gain legal advice and ensure that corporate
objectives are accomplished within the law. While there may be some
short-term benefit to the public in prosecuting a guilty company by
means of forcing the company's lawyer to report corporate misdeeds
or disgorge confidential documents, in the long term, the detriments
associated with such actions are greater.
Letter from Barry Nagler et al. to Jonathan G. Katz, supra note 248.
250
See infra text accompanying notes 251-72.
248
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treated as confidential. 251 The attorney-client privilege, as defined in the
Professional Rules of Conduct, help to facilitate communications in three
ways. 2 2 First, clients will be encouraged to hire attorneys because of
their special and unique training as a lawyer. 253 Second, it furthers the
duty of the lawyer by helping to ensure that the clients will share
truthful information with the lawyer. 254 Third, it helps to ensure that the
civil and criminal justice systems work as effectively as possible. 255 The
public policy of the privilege rule recognizes that there is an interest in
25 6
maintaining confidentiality in certain relationships and circumstances.
The communications between the corporate counsel and the
constituents of the organization fall within the context of attorney-client
confidentiality if counsel is rendering legal advice, assessing grounds for
corporate liability, handling whistle-blower reports, and conducting
internal investigations and evaluations of an organization's risk. 25 7 An

Leslie C. Levin, Testing the Radical Experiment: A Study of Lawyer Response to Clients
iho Intend to Harm Others, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 81-85 (1994). The Codes of professional
conduct and other laws have attempted to address the issue facing attorneys when lawyers
must deal clients and their conscience. Id. The "solutions" vary greatly from allowing
attorneys wide discretion in deciding whether to disclose to requiring disclosure. Id. at 83.
252 Minkoff, supra note 242, at 197-98.
253 Id. The observance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate confidential
information of the client encourages people to seek early representation and facilitates that
full development of the facts essential to proper representation of the client. MODEL CODE
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2003).
254 Minkoff, supra note 242, at 198. A fundamental principle in the lawyer client
relationship is that the lawyer maintains confidentiality of information relating to the
representation. Id. at 197. The client is thereby encouraged to communicate fully and
frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter.
251

MODEL CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 4 (2003).
255 Minkoff, supra note 242, at 198. "Almost without exception, clients come to lawyers in

order to determine what their rights and what is, in the complex of laws and regulations,
deemed to be legal and correct." Id. Lawyers, from experience, know that the majority of
clients follow the advice given, and therefore the law is most likely upheld. MODEL CODE
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 3 (2003).
256 CARNEY, supra note 237, at 37-40; 3 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 11:1 (2002). The
attorney must make an effort in verifying the information from the corporation's
constituents and then be able to rely on the information disclosed by the client. CARNEY,
supra note 234, at 37-40. If a lawyer is forced to disclose information to the SEC, then the
incentive for the corporation can diminish even though such consultation may have
avoided a liability. Id. With the growing regulation of corporations, the lawyer's opinion
can be even more valuable. Id.
257 Gruner, supra note 237, at 1176-82; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE L. GOVERNING

LAW. § 59 (2000). "Confidential client information consists of information relating to
representation of a client, other than information that is generally known." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE L. GOVERNING LAW. § 59.
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attorney that is required to disclose possible violations to the SEC
obtained through attorney-client confidentiality may place an attorney at
odds with state rules that would consider such disclosure a violation of
client confidences. 258 Additionally, such disclosure would spur a SEC
investigation and even civil lawsuits.259
Currently the ABA Model Rules allow for an attorney to reveal client
confidences when an attorney "reasonably believes" that the attorney
must do so to prevent a client from committing a criminal act that is
likely to result in substantial bodily harm or injury to the financial
interests of another.260 Some states, like New Jersey, Wisconsin, Texas,
and Virginia go a step further and require an attorney to disclose
information to prevent "substantial injury to the financial interest or
property of another." 261 The difference in theory of the rules lies in the

This definition covers all information relating to representation of a
client ...It covers information gathered from any source, including
sources such as third persons whose communications are not protected
by the attorney-client privilege. It includes work product that the
lawyer develops in representing the client, such as the lawyer's notes
to a personal file, whether or not the information is immune from
discovery as lawyer work product. It includes information acquired
by a lawyer in all client-lawyer relationships, including functioning as
inside or outside legal counsel ....
Id. § 59 cmt. B (citations omitted); Minkoff, supra note 242, at 214-17. Currently there is a
circuit split regarding the test for what is considered to fall within the privilege claims of
in-house counsel. Minkoff, supra note 242, at 205, 214-15. In-house counsel may be subject
to greater scrutiny and only allowed if the lawyer makes clear that he is rendering legal
advice and not just business advice. Id.
258 See letter from Alfred P. Carlton to Jonathan G. Katz, supra note 181..
259 See id.
260 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2003).
261 WIS. Sup. CT. R. 20:1.6; see supra notes 128-35 and accompanying text; see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE L. GOVERNING LAW. § 67.

(1) A lawyer may use or disclose confidential client information when
the lawyer reasonably believes that its use or disclosure is necessary to
prevent a crime or fraud, and:
(a) The crime or fraud threatens substantial financial loss;
(b) The loss has not yet occurred;
(c) The lawyer's client intends to commit the crime or fraud either
personally or through a third person; and
(d) The client has employed or is employing the lawyer's services in
the matter in which the crime or fraud is being committed.
(2) If a crime or fraud described in Subsection (1) has already occurred,
a lawyer may use or disclose confidential client information when the
lawyer reasonably believes its use or disclosure is necessary to prevent,
rectify, or mitigate the loss.
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duties of a lawyer. 262 The SEC argues that there is a special duty owed to
the investing public. 263 The ABA, however, takes the position that,
although the ethics rules can provide some standards by which to guide
an attorney, routine corporate practices to enhance communications
between corporate counsel and management better improve the
corporate counsel's role in enhancing corporate accountability. 264 The

(3) Before using or disclosing information under this Section, the
lawyer must, if feasible, make a good faith effort to persuade client not
to act. If the client, or other person has already acted, the lawyer must,
if feasible, advise the client to warn the victim or to take other action to
prevent, rectify, or mitigate the loss. The lawyer must, if feasible, also
advise the client of the lawyer's ability to use or disclose information
as provided in this Section and the consequences thereof.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE L. GOVERNING LAW. § 67. The rule and the corresponding
exemptions seek to balance the interests of client confidentiality and lawyer loyalty with
the interests of the public and protecting innocent persons from financial fraud. Id. § 67
cmt. b.
262 See Cheek & Hughey, supra note 131.
263 SEC Proposed Noisy Withdrawal Rule, sutpra note 103.
264 Preliminary ABA Task Force Report, supra note 169.
5. The Corporate Governance Committee ... should recommend for
adoption by the full Board of Directors a corporate code of ethics and
conduct that includes the establishment of a mechanism (such as a hot
line, an ombudsman or compliance certification) through which
information concerning violations of law by the corporation or its
management personnel, or breaches of duty to the corporation which
could have a material effect on the corporation, not appropriately
addressed by corporate officers, can be freely transmitted to more
senior officers and, if necessary, to the Audit or Corporate Governance
Committee. In any investigation by the Board of Directors (or any
committee) of such a violation or breach of duty, the Board (or
committee) should have the authority to retain independent legal
counsel....

7. The Corporate Governance Committee and the Audit Committee
should establish procedures for regular meetings with the corporate
officers responsible for implementing the corporation's internal
controls, codes of ethics and compliance policies-such as general
counsel, the chief internal auditor and the chief compliance officer. At
least a portion of such meetings should routinely be outside the
presence of any other executive officer or director who is not
independent. At such meetings, the responsible officer should report
on legal and compliance affairs of the corporation as directed by the
committee. The scope and content of such reports should be designed
to elicit, at a minimum, information about violations or potential
violations of law and breaches of duty by an executive officer or
director that could have a material adverse effect on the corporation.
Id. (footnote omitted). The ABA recommends a similar line of communication between
outside counsel and a corporation's in-house counsel. Id.
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ethics rules that govern attorneys should provide guidance to attorneys
on how to proceed internally and externally to prevent or rectify
corporate fraud.265 At the same time, they should be balanced against a
266
lawyer's duty to the client and the public.
The conflict in state and SEC proposed rules could consequentially
impair the communications and confidences that lawyers need from
their clients to better serve the public. 267 In addition, the required
disclosure rule forces an attorney to have divided loyalties, which in turn
268
jeopardizes the attorney-client relationship.
The SEC's position mandates the lawyer to disregard any conflicting
state rule requiring the lawyer to maintain confidentiality. 269 It requires
disclosure to the SEC of communications that are protected by state rules
as confidential. 270
The balancing act of encouraging candid

265 See infra text accompanying notes 267-91.
266 See infra text accompanying notes 267-91.
267 See letter from seventy-seven law firms to Jonathan G. Katz, supra note 199; 2 ATT'YCLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE U.S. § 9:27 (2003). Some argue that public interest is better served
with a rule requiring disclosure because it would limit the possibility of abuse by the client
in an attorney-client relationship. Breslin & Dooley, supra note 127, at 728-30. If the client
is aware that the lawyer has a duty to disclose facts learned through client
communications, the client may be less likely to engage in an illegal activity or fraud. Id.
Additionally, it is argued that a client who has a lawyer that has chosen to withdraw
noisily will encounter problems hiring a subsequent attorney and thereby be hindered in
furthering illegal conduct. Id.
We believe the extension of the proposal beyond the mandate of
Section 307 could trigger profound changes in the relationship
between companies and their legal counsel. Specifically, we are
concerned that, contrary to the Commission's expressed intent, the
proposal could deter officers, directors and employees from seeking
advice from counsel on sensitive matters. Although we agree that an
attorney employed or retained by a company represents the company
as an organization- not the company's officers, directors or
employees- counsel cannot effectively represent an organization
without open communication with the people who make up that
organization....
Letter from Henrey A. McKinnell, Chairman of the Board & CEO, Pfizer Inc., to Jonathan
G.
Katz,
Secretary,
SEC
(Dec.
20,
2002),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/S74502/hamckinnell.htm.
268 See letter from Alfred P. Carlton to Jonathan G. Katz, supra note 181.
269 See letter from seventy-seven law firms to Jonathan G. Katz, supra note 199.
270 See letter from seventy-seven law firms to Jonathan G. Katz, supra note 199; see also
Richard M. Phillips, Client Fraud and the Securities Lawyer's Duty of Confidentiality, 49 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 823, 826-27 (1992); Subin, supra note 153, at 1161. A view that does not allow
for any revelations of a fraud is justified by the notion that if a client is to be able to access
the legal system they must be able to do so without any possibility of incrimination,
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communications between lawyers and clients and protecting the
investing public from frauds perpetrated by the client or corporation is
made more difficult if a lawyer and the public are unsure of when and
where information may be used or disclosed.271 At one end of the
spectrum are states that do not allow a lawyer to disclose any
information in situations of a fraud involving a corporation, while at the
other end is the SEC rule requiring disclosure.272 Neither of these rules
properly take into consideration the fact that a lawyer often provides
services that are critical and essential in the complex, intricate matters of
financial and securities law, and that the corporation often relies on
attorneys to assure compliance.
The SEC distinguishes between past frauds and those that are ongoing or about to occur.273 The SEC does not require withdrawal in cases
of past frauds, but permits it.274 The SEC defines an on-going fraud as a
filing with the SEC that an investor may rely on.275 An on-going fraud
includes misstatements that an attorney may have had an unwitting part
in assisting with and any potential reliance on that past fraud. 276 For an
attorney to avoid personal liability, the attorney will be forced to disclose
a past fraud for the fear that there may be an investor relying on the
misstatement or fraud. The SEC justifies the proposed rule by explaining
that with threatened disclosure, CEOs, CFOs, and QLCCs are more likely

however the opposite side views the access the legal system as a right, but not a "power to
subvert the process." Subin, supra note 153, at 1162. Confidentiality is an expectation and
limits as to use of the lawyer-client relationship must be set. Id. For example, a client must
know up front that the attorney's services can not be used to perpetrate a fraud. Id.
271 See letter from seventy-seven law firms to Jonathan G. Katz, supra note 199.
272 See supra notes 110-18, 124-35 and accompanying text.
273 SEC Proposed Noisy Withdrawal Rule, supra note 103.
274 Id.
275 Id.
276

Id.

If the past material violation at issue has already occurred and is not
on-going and is likely to have resulted in substantial financial injury to
the issuer, [this] proposed rule would allow, but not require, the
reporting attorney to withdraw, notify the Commission, and disaffirm
false or misleading filings or submissions that the attorney prepared or
assisted in preparing.
The attorney's silence, under those
circumstances, would not assist the violation. To the extent that the
investors may continue to rely upon false or misleading statements in
earlier filings or submissions, which have not been disaffirmed, the
material violation would be on-going and [the required disclosure
rule] would apply.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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to rectify reported improprieties and frauds. 277 However, the SEC does
not consider the downside of corporations not consulting specialized
attorneys nor the lack of candor that may result from attorneys being
forced to snitch.
The SEC also states that disclosure would not be a breach of
attorney-client privilege.278 The SEC, in requiring disclosure, takes the
decision out of the state court's domain and forces a waiver of privilege
in place of the corporation making the decision. 279 The lack of discretion
for the attorney in making a decision on whether to disclose information
makes the disclosure mandatory 80° Therefore, the information disclosed
to the SEC by the attorney may be subject to a limited waiver. 281 Since

277 Id.; see letter from seventy-seven law firms to Jonathan G. Katz, supra note 199; letter
from Arthur P. Carlton to Jonathan G. Katz, supra note 181. It is argued that a noisy
withdrawal serves the purpose of alerting third parties that the lawyer will no longer be
responsible for the documents prepared by her and that any further inferences of client
misconduct are of the third party, not the lawyer's withdrawal. Breslin & Dooley, supra
note 127, at 733. However, it is more than likely, with such a disclosure to the SEC, that an
investigation into the practices of the corporation would be launched, as is the duty of the
SEC. See letter from Arthur P. Caplan to Jonathan G. Katz, supra note 181. For the SEC to
not take any action would not serve public interest of deterring fraud, therefore an attorney
notifying the SEC and disaffirming any documents would be considered evidence of
misconduct by the corporation. Letter from seventy-seven law firms to Jonathan G. Katz,
supra note 199; letter from Arthur P. Carlton to Jonathan G. Katz, supra note 181. The SEC,
in 2001, announced a major shift in its enforcement programs. 3 LAW SEC. & REG.
§ 16.2(19)(B) (4th ed. 2002). The SEC sought to encourage more self-policing by reporting
corporations by announcing that in determining whether to bring enforcement actions
against corporations, several factors would be considered. Id. The SEC will consider,
among others, whether the internal control processes provide effective self-policing
mechanisms, the extent of the company's cooperation with the SEC, the extent of
cooperation with other law enforcement agencies, and whether the company disciplined
the persons responsible and compensated the victims. Id.; Report of Investigation Pursuant
to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Commission Statement on
the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Decisions, Exchange Act Release
Binder]
(Oct. 23,
2001),
available at
No. 34-44969,
[2001-2002
Transfer
This approach is similar to the one
http://www.sec.gov/reports/34-44969.htm.
announced by the SEC in the 1970s and will likely result in the vigilant enforcement of
securities laws violations. 3 LAW SEC. & REG. § 16.2(19)(B) (4th ed. 2002). This is especially
so after Enron and similar type revelations. Id.
278 SEC Proposed Noisy Withdrawal Rule, supra note 103, § 205.3(d)(3). The proposed
rule provides, "The notification to the Commission prescribed by this [rule] does not
breach the attorney-client privilege." Id.
279 See letter from seventy-seven law firms to Jonathan G. Katz, supra note 199.
280 Other Conduct That May Waive Privilege, COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS & CORP. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES § 5:28 (2003) [hereinafter Conduct That May Waive Privilege].
281 Id. There is currently controversy as to what constitutes voluntary and involuntary
disclosure. Id.
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the purpose of the disclosure rule is to protect investors, it is assumed
that the SEC will be able to pursue any necessary investigation and
rectify the fraud prior to shareholder or investor harm. In doing so, the
SEC would have to honor the limited waiver and not disclose the
privileged information to the public or the shareholders.
However, if a lawyer has discretion, the lawyer has the ability to
work internally to the best of her ability to solve the problem and
encourage necessary compliance.2 2 In addition, the information gained
2 3
by the disclosure would not be available to directly protect the public. 8
Subject to the limited waiver rule, the shareholders and investors will
not be able to access the information. 28 Although the SEC acknowledges
that required disclosure would be rare, an attorney would be forced to
decide whether or not to disclose in order to protect herself from the SEC
or to violate the state ethics rules. 28 5
State rules that permit disclosure, instead of requiring disclosure,
allow an attorney to take into consideration the response of the notified
parties, the materiality of the situation, and the possible ramifications of
either reporting or not reporting. 286 A rule that allows an attorney to use
her discretion in revealing corporate frauds in which her services were
used protects the lawyer and the investing public by encouraging the

282 Gruner, supra note 237, at 1152; see also RUSSELL B. STEVENSON, JR., CORPORATIONS AND
INFORMATION 85-100 (1980) (discussing the volume, importance, and the need for security
and secrecy in corporation documents).
M Phillips, supra note 270, at 829. There are often two stages to a SEC investigation. 3
LAW SEC. REG. § 16.2(7) (4th ed. 2002). First, there is an informal investigation where the
target corporation is not required to have notice regarding the SEC investigation. Id.
Frequently, the first stage of an investigation will lead to a second-stage formal
investigation. Id. The decision of the SEC to conduct an investigation is not up for judicial
review. Id. The SEC only needs to believe there is a "likelihood" of a securities violation to
initiate an investigation. Id. Upon launching a formal investigation, the SEC obtains
subpoena power that can only be challenged if the corporation refuses to comply and the
SEC brings an enforcement action. Id. Generally, as long as there is good faith shown, a
court will uphold the subpoena and the corporation will be forced to comply. Id.
Additionally, the SEC conducts interviews to gain information about the corporation and
its practices. Id. Upon completion of the investigation, the SEC will notify the corporation
of its findings, giving the corporation an opportunity to contest the determination. Id. If
the SEC finds a wrong-doing, a suit authorization is issued. Id. If the SEC chooses to
pursue the suit, an injunctive action may be brought in federal court or the case can be
referred to the Department of Justice to determine if criminal sanctions are appropriate. Id.
Parallel proceedings are appropriate and do not constitute double jeopardy. Id. § 16.2(8)
284 Id. § 16.2(7); see Hicks, supra note 137, at 965-66.
285 SEC Proposed Noisy Withdrawal Rule, supra note 103.
'M
See supra notes 130-40 and accompanying text.
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organization to rectify the situation rather than risk disclosure. 287 The
required affirmative actions set out by the SEC create a situation where
2
the attorney is required to disclose in order not to breach a duty.
Lawyers are often sued for assisting in their client's frauds based on 2020 hindsight, on the notion that they should have known of the criminal
conduct taking place within the organization. 289 The affirmative duty
created by the SEC places the attorney in a situation where her decision
to withdraw can lead to the possibility of breaching a state ethical rule,
suspension or disbarment proceedings from practicing before the SEC, or
a prolonged and damaging investigation by the SEC. 29° The attorney is
in a position where being wrong can be very damaging to her practice,
291
the law firm, and possibly the organization which she represents.
Further, the rule of mandatory disclosure to the SEC is outside the
legislative intent of Congress. 292 The SEC, in its commentary, states that
the proposed rules would be incomplete without requiring notification
to the Commission in extreme situations. 293 Further, the agency has the
authority to take actions against professionals in order to protect the
integrity of its processes. 294 However, in the Senate floor debate, Senator
Michael Enzi from Wyoming stated that the amendment would support
internal disclosure and not any external reporting. 295 In the entire

287

CARNEY, supra note 237, at 38; Phillips, supra note 270, at 829; see also CHARLES W.

WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 160-67 (1986) (discussing the necessity of candid client

communications and lawyer discretion in dealing with misconduct).
288 See Phillips, supra note 270. An affirmative duty must be clear and subject to little
interpretation in order for an attorney to respond. See letter from Arthur P. Carlton to
Jonathan G. Katz, supra note 181. If the rule is vague and too broad, attorneys will likely
not take the action intended in enacting the rule, thereby, defeating the public interest
aspect of the duty. Id.
2S9 Phillips, supra note 270, at 830; Marc I. Steinberg, Attorney Liability Under the Securities
Laws, 45 SW. L.J. 711, 728-30 (1991).
29
See Phillips, supra note 270; letter from seventy-seven law firms to Jonathan G. Katz,
supra note 199.
291 See letter from Arthur P. Carlton to Jonathan G. Katz, supra note 181.
292 Letter from seventy-seven law firms to Jonathan G. Katz, supra note 199; letter from
Arthur P. Carlton to Jonathan G. Katz, supra note 181; letter from Charles E.H. Leudde to
Jonathan G. Katz, supra note 186.
293 See supra notes 110-18 and accompanying text (discussing the procedure for "noisy
withdrawal" outlined in the proposed provision); SEC Proposed Noisy Withdrawal Rule,
supra note 103.
294 See supra notes 110-18 and accompanying text (discussing the procedure for "noisy
withdrawal" outlined in the proposed provision); SEC Proposed Noisy Withdrawal Rule,
supra note 103.
295 148 CONG. REC. S6524, S6555 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Enzi).
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legislative history, there is no evidence that Congress intended a "noisy
296
withdrawal" rule.
The SEC's proposed "noisy withdrawal" requirement threatens to
297
alter the confidences that corporate clients place in their attorneys.
The critical role that attorneys play within the corporate arena can serve

[An internal reporting obligation] is still less onerous than that
imposed on accountants under section 10A of the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act, which requires an auditor to report, both to the client's
directors and simultaneously to the SEC, an [sic] illegal act if
management fails to take remedial action.
The amendment I am supporting would not require the attorneys
to report violations to the SEC, only to corporate legal counsel or the
CEO, and ultimately, to the board of directors .... This amendment
also does not empower the SEC to cause attorneys to breach their
attorney/client privilege. Instead, as is the case now, attorneys and
clients can assert this privilege in court.
Id. Senator Corzine states:
The bottom line is this. Lawyers can and should play an important
role in preventing and addressing corporate fraud. Our amendment
seeks to ensure that. It seeks to go back to the old way: When lawyers
know of illegal actions by a corporate agent, they should be required to
report the violation to the corporation.
Id. at S5556 (statement of Sen. Corzine). An exchange regarding the purpose of the
amendment provides:
Senator Sarbanes: Mr. President ... It is my understanding that this
amendment, which places responsibility upon the lawyer for the
corporation to report up-the-ladder only involves going up within the
corporate structure. He doesn't go outside of the corporate structure.
So the lawyer would first go to the chief legal officer, or the chief
executive officer, and if he didn't get an appropriate response, he
would go to the board of directors. Is that correct?
Senator Edwards: Mr. President, my response to the question is the
only obligation that this amendment creates is the obligation to report
to the client, which begins with the chief legal officer, and, if that is
unsuccessful, then to the board of the corporation. There is no
obligation to report anything outside the client- the corporation.
Senator Sarbanes: I think that is an important point.
Id. at S6557 (statements of Sen. Edwards & Sen. Sarbanes); see also letter from Joseph A.
Grundfest et al. to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (Dec. 23, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/S74502/jagrundfest1.htm (arguing that if Congress
wanted to create a requirement for lawyers to report to the SEC, they would have done so
explicitly as they had in Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, requiring
auditors to report violations not resolved internally within a corporation).
296 Letter from Joseph A. Grundfest et al. to Jonathan G. Katz, supra note 295; letter from
Roberta S. Karmel, former Commissioner of the SEC, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC
(Dec. 12, 2002), availableat http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/S74502/karmell.thm.
2W See supra text accompanying notes 246-72.
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to encourage corporate compliance. 298 A rule that would require an
attorney to disclose information to the SEC would force an attorney to
reveal confidences to avoid potential personal liability. 299 Congress, in
granting authority to the SEC to promulgate an up-the-ladder rule, never
intended to force lawyers to snitch to the SEC and jeopardize the
3°°
confidentiality between an attorney and a client.
Therefore, the investing public would be better served if rules and
regulations that encourage legal compliance and candid communications
between attorney and client were proscribed. This Note advocates a
clearly defined scope of the SEC promulgated up-the-ladder reporting
rule. Additionally, this Note recommends that the ABA and state bars
emphasize the attorney's role in encouraging legal compliance within a
corporation. Finally, the Note urges the ABA and state bars to adopt
similar permissive notification provisions to necessary third parties in
situations where fraud can be prevented and the attorney has exhausted
all other recommended remedies, thus, reasonably believing external
reporting to be necessary and in the best interest of the
client/organization.
IV. PROPOSED RECONCILIATION OF CONFLICTING PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
STANDARDS

A. An Attorney's Duty to Report Up-the-Ladder
The SOA was intended to protect the investing public. 301 Section 307
seeks to protect the public by granting authority to the SEC to create a
reporting procedure for attorneys in cases of fraud or improprieties
discovered by the attorney. 3 2 Because regulation of lawyers has been
traditionally left to the state bars, the SEC must promulgate attorney
conduct rules that do not force the attorney to violate one law in order to
30 3
follow another.
A broad interpretation of the scope of lawyers that fall under the upthe-ladder reporting requirement will lead to confusion as to whom the
duty applies. 3° 4 Additionally, the SEC must stay within the legislative
298 See supratext accompanying
29 See supra text accompanying
3M
See supra text accompanying
301 See supra Part 1.B.
302 See supra Part I1.5.
M3
See supra Part III.A-B.
34
See supra text accompanying

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol38/iss4/3

notes 237-47.
notes 267-91.
notes 292-96.

notes 153-205.

Ahuja: What Do I Do Now? A Lawyer's Duty Post-Sarbanes-Oxley

20041

A Lawyer's Duty

1331

intent of the SOA when promulgating the up-the-ladder reporting
rule. 30 5 The scope of the rule must be narrowed. The rule must limit the
definition of "appearing and practicing before the Commission" to
attorneys who play a significant role in securities compliance.30 6 Only
then will the attorney be cognizant of her duty from the onset of her
representation of the client.30 7 An attorney preparing a document for a
corporation should not have to rely on the corporation to notify her of
the possible use in a securities compliance matter. 308 This places the
burden on the corporation and places the attorney in a position where
she may be subject to liability for lack of notice. 3°9 Instead, an attorney
who takes a significant part in securities compliance would be aware that
she is subject to the affirmative duty and be able to comply without
exposing herself to liability. Additionally, the legislative history shows
that Congress intended for the SEC to regulate only attorneys who are
310
responsible for securities compliance.
A narrow interpretation would also allow an objective triggering
311
standard of a "reasonably prudent securities compliance attorney."
With an expansive scope, as enacted by the SEC, a non-securities lawyer
would be held to the same standard as a securities compliance attorney,
which will not further the congressional objective of protecting
investors. 312 The narrow definition proposed by this Note allows the
SEC to focus on attorneys who are in a position to identify, detect, and
prevent corporate fraud in securities compliance areas.
B.

Proposed Definition to Narrow the Scope of Attorneys Subject to the SEC
PromulgatedRule
§ 205.2(a) Definition of Appearing and Practicing Before
the Commission:
(a) Appearing and practicing before the Commission
includes, but is not limited to, an attorney who significantly
takes part,advises, or whose main responsibility is:

305 See supratext accompanying
306 See supratext accompanying
307 See supra text accompanying
'0
See supra text accompanying
M9 See supra text accompanying
310 See supra text accompanying
311 See supra text accompanying
312 See supra text accompanying
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(1) Transacting business with the Commission on behalf of
and as requested by and in the interests of the client;
(2) Representing an issuer to, or the subject of, or a witness
in a Commission administrativeproceeding;
(3) Representing any person in connection with any
Commission investigation, inquiry, information request, or
subpoena;
(4) Preparing,or participating in the process of preparing
any material statement, opinion, or other writing which the
attorney has reason to believe will be filed with or incorporated
into a required registration statement, notification,
application, report, communication, or other document filed
with or submitted to the Commissioners, or its staff, on behalf
of a client.
Comments:
(1) The scope of this definition is limited to attorneys who
materially participate in the Federal securities compliance of
the client. Attorneys that take part in reviewing or preparing
documents that are not for the sole or primary purpose of
securities compliance and the documents are reviewed or
preparedin goodfaith,fall outside the scope of this definition.
(2) An attorney who advises that a statement, opinion, or
other writing does not need to be incorporated into any
registration statement, notification, application, report,
communication, or other document filed with or submitted
with the Commission and who has done so in goodfaith is not
considered to be Appearing and Practicing Before the
Commission.
(3) An attorney who advises that a client is obligated to
submit or file a registration statement, notification,
application, report, communication, or other document and
who has done so in good faith is not considered to be
Appearing and PracticingBefore the Commission.
(4) Communication includes all oral and
statements made to the Commission or its staff.
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C. Additional Recommendations That Will Ultimately Serve the Public
Interest
The up-the-ladder reporting serves the public interest by detailing
the reporting procedure an attorney is required to engage in upon
detecting fraud. 313
This procedure informs management and
simultaneously allows management an opportunity to respond. 314 An
attorney is able to serve in the best interests of the shareholders by
encouraging corporate compliance. 315 However, if the attorney is forced
to disclose information to the SEC, the attorney becomes a risk factor to
the corporation. By forcing disclosure, a client is less likely to disclose
information, thereby, inhibiting corporate compliance instead of
encouraging it.
The public interest would be better served if the SEC withdrew its
proposal for "noisy withdrawal" and instead strongly encouraged the
ABA and the state bars to adopt a similar up-the-ladder reporting
requirement for all practicing attorneys. 316 A state promulgated up-theladder reporting requirement would provide substantiated guidance to
attorneys and corporations and help to promote the confidence of
shareholders in the legal profession. The ABA and state promulgated
rules should encourage an attorney that has knowledge of fraud to take
action that will minimize harm to the corporation. 317 A rule that
promotes minimization of disruption to the corporation does not serve
the public interest, because it discourages an attorney to take prompt
action to protect the client/organization.

See supra text accompanying notes 88-109.
See supra text accompanying notes 108-09.
315
See supra text accompanying notes 237-300.
316 See supra Part III.B.
In complex fields like securities regulation, the regulatory process
provides critical texture to legislative enactments. But, even an agency
as wonderful as the SEC has, and should have, limitations on the
problems we can solve, as well as on the solutions we can put forth. In
my view, government's best role is to define what is illegal, and work
with the private sector to help it define what is unethical or
incompetent. If all institutions play their proper role, Congress will
articulate broad standards, the SEC will define legal requirements
under those standards, and the private sector will augment those legal
requirements with additional ethical and moral prescriptions and
proscriptions.
SEC Address from Pitt, supra note 7.
317 See supra text accompanying notes 203-05.
313
314
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Additionally, as the ABA has recently done, all state bars should
adopt rules that permit disclosure in situations where an attorney has
evidence that a client will commit an illegal or fraudulent act that may
result in substantial financial harm to others. 318 A rule that permits
disclosure allows an attorney to consider the materiality of the situation
and take appropriate actions. 319 An attorney that has attempted internal
disclosures in compliance with either the state or SEC promulgated rule
can then consider the surrounding circumstances and disclose the
information to the necessary third party without fear of disciplinary
proceedings. Legal compliance within corporations is promoted when
balancing the interests of preserving confidential client communications
and serving the interests of the public in preventing corporate fraud.
V.

CONCLUSION

Lawyers are an essential part of an organization. They serve in
many capacities within an organization and can be a very critical and
vital resource. Corporations must be able to look to attorneys to provide
sound legal advice. Shareholders must feel confident that the attorney is
acting in the best interests of the corporation. The problem of corporate
giants "cooking the books" and thinking they can get away with it is not
a new problem, but one revisited time and time again. As society
progresses, manipulation progresses as well. The problem is not one of
the legal profession or the accounting profession alone.
Corporate greed is an ever-evolving art form. One that Congress
tried to stay ahead of, but failed. Congress has been trying to protect the
investing public since the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933. There
have been many countless rules and regulations put in place to deter,
detect, and prevent corporate fraud since 1933. Investors wonder why

See supra text accompanying notes 282-91.
No set of legal rules or guidelines can guarantee that such active care
will be achieved in practice .... And certainly, no reasonable amount
of active care will invariably prevent fraud or other misconduct by
corporate management. The Task Force nonetheless believes that its
recommendations would significantly enhance corporate governance
practices and ethical principles to make it more likely that the system
of checks and balances involving ... corporate counsel will work
effectively to help ensure that the corporation is ethically and legally
responsible and managed in the long run best interests of the
corporation and its shareholders.
Preliminary ABA Task Force Report, supra note 169.
319 See supra text accompanying notes 260-68.
318

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol38/iss4/3

Ahuja: What Do I Do Now? A Lawyer's Duty Post-Sarbanes-Oxley

2004]

A Lawyer's Duty

1335

none of these rules deterred, detected, or prevented the recent round of
corporate greed. The answer from Congress was more laws and
regulations so that, maybe, there will not be a next time. There probably
will be a next time, with new methods, thereby requiring new laws. The
legal profession must also evolve and adapt as the times and methods
change, so that maybe there will not be a next time. Or at the least, we
can say the lawyer was not to blame.
Samantha Ahuja
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